Riyadh vs Abu Dhabi: The Gulf’s fiercest rivalry breaks into the open

Once a unified front in West Asia, the Saudi–UAE partnership is unraveling fast. What began as quiet divergence has now burst into open conflict across the region's critical fault lines.

06.01.2026

By Fouad Ibrahim

Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/riyadh-vs-abu-dhabi-the-gulfs-fiercest-rivalry-breaks-into-the-open

There have been differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE for some time, but not to the point of a full-blown crisis. The questions now are whether this dispute can be resolved or whether it will escalate, and how far Saudi Arabia or the UAE is willing to go in this rivalry.

The rupture became unmistakable in December 2025, when Saudi Arabia formally demanded the withdrawal of UAE-backed forces from the Yemeni provinces of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra. The demand – backed by Saudi airstrikes on allied militias – marked an unprecedented low in relations between the two states, which were long regarded as the backbone of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

From Yemen to Sudan, Syria, Somalia, and the Red Sea basin, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are increasingly at odds, backing rival forces and seeking dominance – often at the expense of regional stability.

Diverging paths: How the alliance cracked

For decades, Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked in lockstep. Since the GCC’s formation in 1981, their shared approach to regional security and economic integration masked bigger differences. Their alliance intensified after the 2011 Arab uprisings, when both states sought to crush protest movements and counter the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Saudi-led war on Yemen in 2015 appeared to seal this alliance. The UAE played a major military role in the campaign against the Sanaa-based government. But beneath the surface, the two partners were pursuing very different goals.

Riyadh aimed to defeat Ansarallah-aligned armed forces and reinstall a compliant central government in Sanaa. Abu Dhabi focused on seizing ports, islands, and maritime routes, building influence through local proxies.

This divergence exploded into the open when the UAE threw its weight behind the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks to partition Yemen by reviving a southern state – directly challenging Saudi insistence on Yemeni unity.

Saudi Arabia's strategic imperatives

Riyadh’s regional posture remains grounded in regime preservation and geopolitical containment. The preservation of territorial unity in Yemen is a key concern, as Saudi rulers fear that southern secessionism could set a dangerous precedent for restive regions within the kingdom.

This anxiety is compounded by the fact that parts of Saudi Arabia’s southern border – such as the provinces of Jizan, Asir, and Najran – are historically Yemeni lands annexed under the 1934 Treaty of Taif, a legacy that remains sensitive in nationalist circles in Sanaa.

Containing Iran remains central, as Riyadh views Ansarallah and the Sanaa government as Iranian proxies and is determined to prevent Tehran from entrenching itself on Saudi Arabia's southern flank. Finally, the kingdom continues to project itself as a leading authority in the Sunni Muslim world, a status that requires resisting the rise of rival spheres of influence.

The UAE's expansive ambitions

Under Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), the UAE has become far more assertive in its regional posture. Maritime hegemony lies at the heart of its strategy. With limited territorial depth, Abu Dhabi has invested in ports and shipping lanes from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, aiming to control chokepoints critical to global trade.

The fight against political Islam is equally central, as the Emirati leadership views the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat and has consistently backed secular strongmen and militias to suppress Islamic movements.

In parallel, the UAE has launched an aggressive economic expansion, with state-linked entities acquiring strategic infrastructure and resources across West Asia and Africa, frequently clashing with Saudi interests.

Proxy warfare from Syria to the Horn of Africa

This rivalry now plays out across several conflict zones. During the height of the war in Syria, Riyadh backed extremist Sunni Salafi groups as a counterweight to Iranian influence. The UAE took a different path. It was among the first to reopen its embassy in Damascus in 2018, seeking to rehabilitate the government of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Abu Dhabi also cooperated with Kurdish forces and worked to sideline Islamist factions, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by current Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who formerly went by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani when he was an Al-Qaeda commander.

In Sudan, Riyadh supports General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces, viewing them as a stabilizing force and a partner in securing the Red Sea corridor. In contrast, the UAE has backed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), despite their documented atrocities, driven by hostility to Islamist currents and a desire to control key resources.

In Somalia, both states have carved out rival spheres of influence. Abu Dhabi has entrenched itself in Somaliland and Puntland, while Riyadh has strengthened ties with the federal government in Mogadishu. This competition extends across the Red Sea, where ports and islands have become high-stakes strategic assets.

Yemen: Flashpoint of the Gulf feud

Last month’s Saudi airstrikes on UAE-backed forces in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra marked a dramatic escalation. Riyadh demanded a full STC withdrawal from the provinces. When this was ignored, Saudi jets struck positions held by forces previously regarded as allies.

This response reveals Riyadh’s growing alarm. Emirati and Israeli entrenchment in southern Yemen and the Horn of Africa now pose a direct threat to Saudi national security and maritime access. The kingdom also views the STC’s separatist project as a dangerous precedent that could reverberate within its own borders.

The strikes signaled that Saudi Arabia would no longer tolerate unchecked Emirati expansion, even at the cost of fracturing GCC unity. Abu Dhabi, however, has stood by its allies, offering only token compromises such as proposals for joint control of key infrastructure.

A rivalry years in the making

Saudi officials were not blindsided by Abu Dhabi's moves. Emirati support for southern separatists was evident by 2017 and intensified in the following years, particularly after the UAE reduced its troop footprint and increased backing for the STC.

Even in the early years of the Yemen war, differences were clear: Riyadh upheld the unity of Yemen and supported the exiled government, while Abu Dhabi empowered militias with anti-Islamist and separatist agendas.

The public rupture now reflects the formalization of a long-brewing conflict. Escalatory rhetoric on platforms such as X, including from figures like Saud al-Qahtani, signals that backchannel efforts have failed and the rift is no longer containable.

Saudi escalation: Red lines without rupture

Despite the rising tensions, a direct military confrontation between the two Persian Gulf monarchies remains unlikely.

Saudi Arabia is prepared to escalate, but will do so through indirect, deniable methods. Riyadh is expected to double down on political warfare in Yemen, support southern factions opposed to the STC, conduct limited airstrikes aimed at weakening UAE-aligned forces, and apply economic and diplomatic pressure on Emirati interests.

Missile strikes or overt warfare would risk collapsing the Gulf's collective security architecture and invite foreign intervention. Both states are deeply embedded in western security structures, making such outcomes improbable. Instead, Saudi Arabia will seek to assert dominance through calibrated, indirect measures.

Reshaping the region

The consequences of this rupture are already reverberating across the region. Conflicts are being prolonged, humanitarian crises are worsening, and regional institutions are faltering. The GCC, once touted as a pillar of Gulf unity, is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Tel Aviv, meanwhile, has seized the opportunity to expand its presence in maritime chokepoints and volatile zones.

There are three possible trajectories. The two states may reach an informal understanding that manages competition without resolution. A limited reconciliation could emerge, driven by mutual interests in maritime security and regional stability.

Or, the rivalry could escalate into direct confrontations in Yemen or Sudan, with potentially catastrophic fallout for the region and beyond.

What is clear is that this is no longer a personal or ideological falling-out. The Saudi–UAE rivalry is now structural and increasingly economic. As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi vie for dominance in trade routes, investment flows, and political influence, their competition will shape the trajectory of a multipolar West Asia.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.