No exit in sight: Why Turkey is keeping troops in Syria and Iraq

Despite the SDF's integration deal and peace talks with the PKK, Turkey appears set to maintain a long-term military presence in Syria and Iraq

16.02.2026

By Paul Iddon*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/no-exit-sight-why-turkey-keeping-troops-syria-and-iraq

Despite the recent setback for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and a renewed peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey shows no signs of withdrawing its troops from Syria or Iraq.

“We have no agenda for withdrawing or leaving those areas,” Turkish Defence Minister Yaser Guler told Hurriyet in an interview published on 9 February.

“The decision to withdraw from those areas will be made by the Republic of Turkey,” he said. “We don’t care what others say. There is no decision at present.”

In October 2025, Turkey’s parliament approved the extension of deployments in Syria and Iraq for another three years.

Indefinite presence?

“Turkey wants to maintain an indefinite presence in Iraq to continue to maintain influence over the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) and in Syria to maintain strong influence over the development of post-Assad Syria,” Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told The New Arab.

Turkey’s military presence in both countries is anchored in influencing geopolitical developments on its borders, reducing domestic challenges concerning Kurds, and creating the conditions for Syrian refugees to return home, according to Heras.

“Neither the Iraqi government nor the Syrian government has the ability to contest Turkey’s military presence, and this reality makes a long-term Turkish military presence in those countries relatively low-cost for Ankara,” the analyst added.

Guler’s remarks came shortly after the Syrian military under interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa pushed back the SDF from several Arab-majority regions it captured during the war against the Islamic State (IS). An ally of al-Sharaa and staunch opponent of the SDF, Turkey expressed support for the campaign. Damascus and the SDF have since agreed to integrate the latter’s fighters into the new Syrian army.

With the SDF having endured a major strategic setback, and the US declaring that its ad-hoc partnership with the group against IS has “largely expired,” Turkey’s insistence on keeping troops in northern Syria appears harder to justify.

Ankara sent troops over its southern border in August 2016 to fight IS and block Kurdish forces from advancing westward from their heartland regions and linking up with their isolated northwestern Afrin exclave. Turkey invaded Afrin in early 2018 and swathes of northeastern Syria in October 2019.

Turkey did all of this when Bashar Al-Assad ruled Syria. Since his December 2024 ousting, Ankara now has an ally as president. However, Israel strongly opposes any potential Turkish military deployment to bases in central Syria, as authorised by Damascus, and swiftly advanced into the demilitarised buffer zone in southwest Syria near the occupied Golan Heights after Assad fled, retaining forces there.

“Ankara can point to the continued Israeli occupation of southern Syria in a whataboutism argument for its continued presence,” Joshua Landis, Director of the Centre of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, told TNA. “If the US or others suggest that Turkey withdraw, (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan can ask that it be part of a synchronised withdrawal of all powers from the region,” he said.

More broadly, Turkey seeks continued leverage in Syria and Iraq to “preserve influence over many points of friction” in addition to having a say in how Damascus and Baghdad deal with their respective Kurdish minorities.

Turkey and the new Syria

“Erdogan helped al-Sharaa beat Assad and undoubtedly believes that al-Sharaa’s immense debt to Turkey has not been fully paid,” Landis said.

Additionally, the Syria analyst noted that there remain other “contentious issues” between Ankara and Damascus.

“Local Syrian industrialists have been demanding that Damascus raise tariffs in the face of cheap Turkish imports, which are underselling them. Damascus has signed a major Tartus port agreement, but there are other trade, defence, and transportation deals that are pending,” he said.

“The Kurdish question has not been resolved in Syria,” he added. “So long as many issues remain unresolved, Ankara will insist on having a say and will want to retain leverage.”

Aside from influence on the Kurdish issue, Turkey sees broader strategic benefits to its continued military presence.

“Ankara and Saudi Arabia are both working together to limit Israel’s hegemonic position in the region now that the Axis of Resistance has largely been destroyed,” Landis said. “A new security architecture is emerging in the region.”

The Iranian-backed self-styled resistance axis of regional militias endured Israel’s assassination of veteran Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Assad’s overthrow in late 2024. These developments benefited Israel by strategically weakening Iran and its proxies.

“Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar want to contain Israel,” Landis said. “This is one reason that Turkey will not want to weaken its position in Syria. It sees Syria as an important piece in their effort to contain Israel,” he added.

“They fear Israel’s ability to strike regional countries at will, as Israel has demonstrated in its recent bombing campaigns against Doha or Iran.”

Internal instability also limits Damascus’s ability or even willingness to demand any Turkish military withdrawal.

“The sooner Damascus consolidates its grip on the country and is able to find a successful modus vivendi with the country’s minorities, the more able it will be to demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops,” Landis said.

“So long as Syrian internal security remains unreliable and so long as regime-aligned militias retain a degree of independence, Ankara will feel justified in preserving its position inside Syria.”

Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, believes it’s too early to “draw a conclusion” about Ankara’s next steps in Syria or Iraq. In Syria, it may “seek to capitalise on the momentum” against the SDF.

“However, the political environment in Iraq presents a far more complex set of challenges,” Ozeren told TNA.

While Syria appears somewhat closer to a potential resolution, Iraq involves a broader group of actors beyond the PKK, the KRG, and the government in Baghdad.

“The presence of additional political, sectarian, and regional dynamics makes the Iraqi question considerably more intricate,” Ozeren said.

“As a result, Ankara will likely need to adopt a more cautious and calibrated approach in addressing its objectives there.”

Balancing security and political relations

Unlike Syria, Turkey’s military presence in Iraq dates to the 1990s, when it launched intermittent cross-border operations against PKK redoubts in Iraqi Kurdistan’s mountains.

In 2018, Turkey began expanding its presence deeper than ever into that autonomous Kurdish region, establishing more remote military outposts. Ankara angered Iraqi Kurds in May 2021 when satellite images revealed it was deforesting parts of Iraqi Kurdistan to build roads for its army.

In February 2026, it emerged that Turkey was building another road in the autonomous region’s western Duhok province.

Turkey is presently engaged in extensive peace negotiations with the PKK, which have made notable progress. For example, the group renounced its armed struggle on 12 May 2025. On 9 July, its longtime imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called on all members to lay down their weapons. Two days later, PKK fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan burned their guns as a goodwill gesture.

Additionally, on 16 November, the group announced that it had withdrawn from Iraqi Kurdistan’s strategic Zap region, describing the move as a “significant practical contribution” toward peace.

“Despite the symbolic gestures of disarmament, the core PKK presence in Iraq continues to retain its weapons,” Ozeren said. “The peace process in Turkey is still ongoing, although it has been noticeably slowed.”

Without a full dissolution and verifiable disarmament, Ankara is unlikely to withdraw its military presence from either Iraq or Syria.

“While there is an ongoing peace process domestically, Turkey will likely require external actors’ involvement - particularly the US and the European Union - to play a constructive role in Iraq, similar to the roles they have previously assumed in Syria,” Ozeren said.

Ankara has long “exerted pressure” on Iraq to dismantle the PKK presence on its soil. At the same time, it is cognisant of the limits of this objective and has accordingly sought to “balance its security operations with the need to maintain constructive relations” with Baghdad.

“Ankara should take a more cautious approach to this more complex question.”

*Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs

Follow him on X: @pauliddon

Edited by Charlie Hoyle