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US takeover of Iraq’s West Qurna field sidelines Russia, reasserts energy dominance
US sanctions and Iraqi compliance cleared the way for ExxonMobil to replace Russia’s last major oil foothold in Iraq, redrawing the lines of control without firing a shot
12.12.2025
By Abbas al-Zein
Source: https://thecradle.co/articles/us-takeover-of-iraqs-west-qurna-field-sidelines-russia-reasserts-energy-dominance
On 8 December, two Iraqi oil officials confirmed that operations at the West Qurna 2 oil field in southern Iraq had come to a sudden halt. According to the officials, “the reason for the closure is due to a leak in the export pipeline.” But few in Baghdad's energy corridors bought that story.
In the days prior, ExxonMobil had quietly approached Iraq's Oil Ministry, expressing interest in acquiring the majority stake held by Russia's Lukoil in the massive oil field. What followed was a carefully staged sequence of events: a declaration of “force majeure” by Lukoil, suspension of payments by Baghdad, and an open invitation to US companies to step in.
What might look like a technical or contractual dispute is, in fact, a calculated effort to sever Russia’s most strategic energy lifeline in Iraq just months after Washington renewed its push to sideline Moscow globally.
Sanctions as a scalpel
The roots of the West Qurna 2 crisis did not arise suddenly, but came as a direct result of the intertwining of western sanctions on Russia with Baghdad's oil policies.
In 2022, following the escalation of the war in Ukraine, the US and the EU imposed a series of sanctions on Russian companies operating in the energy and oil sector, including restrictions on project financing, banning the supply of technical equipment, and limiting international banking transactions, effectively crippling Russian oil majors abroad.
Lukoil, once the uncontested operator of Iraq's second-largest oil field, found itself increasingly unable to secure the financing or equipment needed to sustain operations. In November, the Russian firm informed the Iraqi Ministry of Oil that it could no longer meet its contractual obligations.
Baghdad's response was swift. The ministry suspended all scheduled cash and in-kind payments to the company and halted oil loads from the field, indicating that the crisis had turned from a mere technical problem into a financial and administrative dispute directed under external pressure.
The state itself intervened to temporarily pay the salaries of workers in the field to ensure the continuation of production, showing the extent of the tension and pressure caused by the restriction of the Russian company's operations.
Lukoil's declaration of “force majeure” was a clear indication of the collapse of the company's ability to operate in an environment paralyzed by western sanctions, which made its continuity in Iraq nearly impossible.
US and British sanctions in particular have been used as a political tool to rearrange influence in Iraq's energy sector, making one of the country's most important oil fields and associated resources a direct target of western restructuring policies.
Why West Qurna 2 matters
Producing close to half a million barrels per day (bpd) – around 10 percent of Iraq's total output – West Qurna 2 is one of the largest in the world, and a cornerstone of Iraq's national revenue, with its production accounting for approximately 0.5 percent of global oil production.
Since signing the operating contract with Lukoil in 2009, Lukoil has controlled 75 percent of the operating stake in the field. This control was not limited to technical management, but also gave Russia indirect influence over one of Iraq's most important energy sources, making any decision or change in the field have economic and domestic policy implications.
That presence also served as a counterweight to US dominance in Iraq's post-2003 energy sector, dominated by western firms like BP and Shell.
The field is one of the pillars of Iraq's oil exports, making controlling it a matter beyond profitability or operational efficiency. Managing this vital resource means being able to control the amount of production and export, thereby influencing national revenues and the deficit or surplus of the state budget.
Any change in the structure of the administration, as we see today with the pressure of western sanctions on Lukoil, opens the door to a rearrangement of influence within the country itself, and leaves Baghdad with limited options between maintaining the Russian partnership or engaging with western partners supported by international political and economic influence.
The removal of Lukoil, then, is not simply about technical or financial constraints; rather, it is about a rebalancing of influence that weakens Russia's foothold in West Asia.
A short history of a long game
Lukoil's presence in Iraq dates back to the Saddam Hussein era, when the company was awarded rights to develop the West Qurna field before being expelled under US pressure in the lead-up to the illegal 2003 invasion. After years of negotiations, Moscow re-entered the field in 2009 with a revised service contract.
Since then, Lukoil has poured substantial capital into infrastructure, training, and production expansion, helping boost West Qurna 2's output to nearly 480,000 bpd. But the company's success also made it a target. As tensions between Moscow and Washington escalated, Iraq's oil sector became another battleground for control.
The recent squeeze on Lukoil completes a two-decade arc that began with its forced exit, returned under fragile US tolerance, and has now ended in a quiet purge.
The US plan: Replace, not compete
Unlike other Russian energy giants like Rosneft or Gazprom, whose Iraq presence is limited, Lukoil was Russia's flagship project in West Asia. Its loss is both symbolic and material. The announcement of ExxonMobil as a likely replacement is ultimately about Washington ensuring its energy hegemony in a region central to its global strategy.
Therefore, the potential control of the field by US companies is not limited to managing production, but also gives Washington near-total leverage to influence Iraq's energy sector by sharing revenues and exports.
This move clearly signals a reduction in Russia's direct influence in Iraq's oil sector, with Lukoil absent as a key incubator of Moscow's interests, and as part of broader shifts in the management of the country's oil sector in the context of an international struggle for resources and investments.
Winners and losers
The West Qurna 2 crisis has laid bare the beneficiaries and the casualties of Iraq's shifting oil politics. The biggest winner is Washington, which now sees its companies poised to control a field accounting for nearly half a million bpd.
In addition to securing oil, this control offers influence over Iraq's fiscal lifelines, investment decisions, and foreign partnerships. Already, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has engaged US energy giant Chevron in discussions about the Nasiriyah oil field – a move widely seen as complementary to ExxonMobil's entry.
For Russia, the loss is monumental. Lukoil's exit means Moscow has ceded its most significant energy foothold in Iraq. The move follows similar setbacks in Syria, where Russia has been squeezed out of major reconstruction and energy projects. With few firms able to replace Lukoil's scale and clout, the Kremlin's presence in the Persian Gulf energy game is diminishing.
These losses also send a warning to other Russian energy firms operating in contested environments: without the legal protection and financial leeway once offered through international partnerships, they are vulnerable to coordinated economic warfare. Iraq, once seen as a key node in Russia's Eurasian energy corridor, is fast slipping into the western column.
For Iraq, the picture is murkier. The immediate upside is stability – continued production, fresh investment, and technical competence. But the long-term cost may be steep: deepened reliance on western firms, reduced sovereignty over energy decisions, and the replication of post-2003 patterns where foreign multinationals dictated Iraq's oil agenda.
The echoes of that era are hard to ignore. Production-sharing agreements (PSAs) and service contracts, once championed as pragmatic tools, are now widely criticized for limiting Iraq's autonomy. In effect, West Qurna 2's shift may well mark a return to that model – only this time under the shadow of a US–Russia rivalry.
Iraq's Oil Ministry insists that the latest moves are motivated by necessity, not politics. Officials cite the need for reliable partners, technical efficiency, and financial solvency. But critics within Iraq argue that this handover is less about capability and more about alignment.
Local voices in Iraq's energy and political arenas warn that by allowing western companies to consolidate control over key assets, Baghdad is undermining the very sovereignty it claims to defend. As was seen in the Rumaila and Majnoon fields post-2003, foreign management often comes with strings attached: pricing mechanisms, export prioritization, and investor-friendly legislation that override national interest.
Has Moscow given up on Iraq?
The reshuffling in West Qurna 2 also raises the following question: Is Russia retreating from West Asia altogether? As The Cradle observed last month, Moscow's strategic priorities have shifted. With the Ukraine war draining resources and reshaping foreign policy, Iraq may simply no longer be a priority.
That reading is supported by Russia's recent energy pullbacks not only in Iraq and Syria but also in the eastern Mediterranean and Egypt.
Whether this is a tactical pause or a long-term strategic retreat remains to be seen. But what is clear is that the US is not waiting. With West Qurna 2 as the latest prize, Washington is redrawing the energy map of Iraq – and with remarkable speed.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
US sanctions and Iraqi compliance cleared the way for ExxonMobil to replace Russia’s last major oil foothold in Iraq, redrawing the lines of control without firing a shot
12.12.2025
By Abbas al-
On 8 December, two Iraqi oil officials confirmed that operations at the West Qurna 2 oil field in southern Iraq had come to a sudden halt. According to the officials, “the reason for the closure is due to a leak in the export pipeline.” But few in Baghdad's energy corridors bought that story.
In the days prior, ExxonMobil had quietly approached Iraq's Oil Ministry, expressing interest in acquiring the majority stake held by Russia's Lukoil in the massive oil field. What followed was a carefully staged sequence of events: a declaration of “force majeure” by Lukoil, suspension of payments by Baghdad, and an open invitation to US companies to step in.
What might look like a technical or contractual dispute is, in fact, a calculated effort to sever Russia’s most strategic energy lifeline in Iraq just months after Washington renewed its push to sideline Moscow globally.
Sanctions as a scalpel
The roots of the West Qurna 2 crisis did not arise suddenly, but came as a direct result of the intertwining of western sanctions on Russia with Baghdad's oil policies.
In 2022, following the escalation of the war in Ukraine, the US and the EU imposed a series of sanctions on Russian companies operating in the energy and oil sector, including restrictions on project financing, banning the supply of technical equipment, and limiting international banking transactions, effectively crippling Russian oil majors abroad.
Lukoil, once the uncontested operator of Iraq's second-
Baghdad's response was swift. The ministry suspended all scheduled cash and in-
The state itself intervened to temporarily pay the salaries of workers in the field to ensure the continuation of production, showing the extent of the tension and pressure caused by the restriction of the Russian company's operations.
Lukoil's declaration of “force majeure” was a clear indication of the collapse of the company's ability to operate in an environment paralyzed by western sanctions, which made its continuity in Iraq nearly impossible.
US and British sanctions in particular have been used as a political tool to rearrange influence in Iraq's energy sector, making one of the country's most important oil fields and associated resources a direct target of western restructuring policies.
Why West Qurna 2 matters
Producing close to half a million barrels per day (bpd) – around 10 percent of Iraq's total output – West Qurna 2 is one of the largest in the world, and a cornerstone of Iraq's national revenue, with its production accounting for approximately 0.5 percent of global oil production.
Since signing the operating contract with Lukoil in 2009, Lukoil has controlled 75 percent of the operating stake in the field. This control was not limited to technical management, but also gave Russia indirect influence over one of Iraq's most important energy sources, making any decision or change in the field have economic and domestic policy implications.
That presence also served as a counterweight to US dominance in Iraq's post-
The field is one of the pillars of Iraq's oil exports, making controlling it a matter beyond profitability or operational efficiency. Managing this vital resource means being able to control the amount of production and export, thereby influencing national revenues and the deficit or surplus of the state budget.
Any change in the structure of the administration, as we see today with the pressure of western sanctions on Lukoil, opens the door to a rearrangement of influence within the country itself, and leaves Baghdad with limited options between maintaining the Russian partnership or engaging with western partners supported by international political and economic influence.
The removal of Lukoil, then, is not simply about technical or financial constraints; rather, it is about a rebalancing of influence that weakens Russia's foothold in West Asia.
A short history of a long game
Lukoil's presence in Iraq dates back to the Saddam Hussein era, when the company was awarded rights to develop the West Qurna field before being expelled under US pressure in the lead-
Since then, Lukoil has poured substantial capital into infrastructure, training, and production expansion, helping boost West Qurna 2's output to nearly 480,000 bpd. But the company's success also made it a target. As tensions between Moscow and Washington escalated, Iraq's oil sector became another battleground for control.
The recent squeeze on Lukoil completes a two-
The US plan: Replace, not compete
Unlike other Russian energy giants like Rosneft or Gazprom, whose Iraq presence is limited, Lukoil was Russia's flagship project in West Asia. Its loss is both symbolic and material. The announcement of ExxonMobil as a likely replacement is ultimately about Washington ensuring its energy hegemony in a region central to its global strategy.
Therefore, the potential control of the field by US companies is not limited to managing production, but also gives Washington near-
This move clearly signals a reduction in Russia's direct influence in Iraq's oil sector, with Lukoil absent as a key incubator of Moscow's interests, and as part of broader shifts in the management of the country's oil sector in the context of an international struggle for resources and investments.
Winners and losers
The West Qurna 2 crisis has laid bare the beneficiaries and the casualties of Iraq's shifting oil politics. The biggest winner is Washington, which now sees its companies poised to control a field accounting for nearly half a million bpd.
In addition to securing oil, this control offers influence over Iraq's fiscal lifelines, investment decisions, and foreign partnerships. Already, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-
For Russia, the loss is monumental. Lukoil's exit means Moscow has ceded its most significant energy foothold in Iraq. The move follows similar setbacks in Syria, where Russia has been squeezed out of major reconstruction and energy projects. With few firms able to replace Lukoil's scale and clout, the Kremlin's presence in the Persian Gulf energy game is diminishing.
These losses also send a warning to other Russian energy firms operating in contested environments: without the legal protection and financial leeway once offered through international partnerships, they are vulnerable to coordinated economic warfare. Iraq, once seen as a key node in Russia's Eurasian energy corridor, is fast slipping into the western column.
For Iraq, the picture is murkier. The immediate upside is stability – continued production, fresh investment, and technical competence. But the long-
The echoes of that era are hard to ignore. Production-
Iraq's Oil Ministry insists that the latest moves are motivated by necessity, not politics. Officials cite the need for reliable partners, technical efficiency, and financial solvency. But critics within Iraq argue that this handover is less about capability and more about alignment.
Local voices in Iraq's energy and political arenas warn that by allowing western companies to consolidate control over key assets, Baghdad is undermining the very sovereignty it claims to defend. As was seen in the Rumaila and Majnoon fields post-
Has Moscow given up on Iraq?
The reshuffling in West Qurna 2 also raises the following question: Is Russia retreating from West Asia altogether? As The Cradle observed last month, Moscow's strategic priorities have shifted. With the Ukraine war draining resources and reshaping foreign policy, Iraq may simply no longer be a priority.
That reading is supported by Russia's recent energy pullbacks not only in Iraq and Syria but also in the eastern Mediterranean and Egypt.
Whether this is a tactical pause or a long-
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.