Turkiye eyes south Lebanon as Hezbollah welcomes possible visit by Erdogan's son
Ankara's expanding presence in Lebanon could soon reach the resistance's southern stronghold, with Amal and Hezbollah signaling openness to a Turkish role amid mounting competition over the country's future.
02.11.2026
By Mohamad Shams Eddine
Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiye-
Turkiye is looking to extend its influence into southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah and the Amal Movement have long held sway, as preparations continue for a possible visit by Bilal Erdogan, son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Such a visit would mark a significant opening between Ankara and the resistance, whose opposing positions over Syria have long strained relations.
The planned visit, expected in mid-
Lebanese media has reported preparations for meetings with President Joseph Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and religious leaders. Tripoli is expected to occupy a central place in the itinerary, although conflicting reports have emerged over whether the visit has been formally finalized.
Ankara's ambitions come as regional powers compete to shape Lebanon's future, from Syria and the eastern Mediterranean to the country's struggling economy and security institutions. The most sensitive issue concerns southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah and Amal – referred to in Lebanon as the Shia Duo – remain deeply entrenched, Israel continues to occupy Lebanese territory, and the approaching end of the UN peacekeeping mission has intensified competition over the region's future.
A Turkish opening in the south
According to information obtained by The Cradle, a visit by Bilal Erdogan to southern Lebanon was among the possibilities considered during the initial planning of his trip.
The proposed southern itinerary was expected to have a social and humanitarian character, including a meeting with a former nominee for governor of Nabatieh who withdrew after failing to meet the appointment requirements. The individual had previously played a prominent role in cooperation with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA).
The planned activities would also extend to several southern communities, where Turkish representatives could highlight assistance provided during and after the war, particularly efforts to shelter displaced families and supply prefabricated housing.
With reconstruction needs mounting and displaced residents struggling to return, Turkish relief and housing projects could help Ankara establish lasting ties with communities devastated by Israeli military operations, giving it a foothold in territory where Iran has historically wielded influence through its relations with Hezbollah and Amal.
The possibility of Bilal Erdogan entering this environment raises questions about Ankara's wider aims, particularly as regional powers compete to influence the arrangements that will follow the withdrawal of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Berri opens the door to Turkiye in the south
The nomination of the Nabatieh governor carried political significance beyond the appointment itself. The position falls within the Amal Movement's traditional share of government appointments, making the selection of a figure associated with TIKA a possible indication of the movement's willingness to accommodate a greater Turkish presence.
According to information obtained by The Cradle, Parliament Speaker Berri has shown no objection to the emergence of a Turkish actor in Lebanon.
South Lebanon faces a vast reconstruction effort, with devastated communities in urgent need of housing and basic services. Lebanon's weakened state institutions have struggled to meet these demands, creating opportunities for foreign governments to finance reconstruction.
Berri's openness to Ankara also comes as discussions intensify over the security arrangements that could succeed UNIFIL. The mission is due to end operations in late 2026, with its withdrawal extending into 2027, raising questions about the forces and international actors that may assume responsibility for maintaining stability.
Turkish involvement could provide Beirut with another source of support as Washington and its allies seek to reshape the security landscape along Lebanon's southern border.
Berri's openness to Ankara would still leave the Turkish government navigating the positions of Amal, Hezbollah, and other regional actors competing for influence in the south. Any expansion beyond humanitarian assistance would require political understandings with these forces, particularly amid Israel's continued occupation of Lebanese territory and competing proposals for the region's security future.
Hezbollah's cautious welcome
Hezbollah's position toward Turkiye remains complicated by years of opposing policies
in Syria and the changing regional balance following the overthrow of former Syrian
president Bashar al-
Sources within Hezbollah who spoke to The Cradle describe relations with Ankara as cautious, although the movement does not regard Turkiye as an adversary comparable to Israel.
The sources indicate that Hezbollah would certainly prefer a Turkish presence in the south to any expansion of Israeli influence, particularly as Tel Aviv continues to press for security arrangements that would weaken the resistance and consolidate its military advantage.
Relations between Hezbollah and Ankara nevertheless remain largely indirect, with Iran serving as an intermediary. According to the sources, these channels have already helped facilitate security understandings in Syria following Assad's fall.
Ankara has since emerged as a major power broker in post-
Sources say efforts are underway to establish more direct communication between Turkiye and Hezbollah, although the process remains gradual. Years of disagreement over Syria and other regional issues have left unresolved disputes that will take time to overcome.
Regarding Bilal Erdogan's proposed visit, Hezbollah sources inform The Cradle that he would be welcomed in southern Lebanon and that party officials would be prepared to receive him should he travel there.
Such a reception would carry considerable political weight. Hezbollah has fought alongside regional allies against forces supported by Ankara, yet the movement appears prepared to explore a more pragmatic relationship with its former adversary in Syria.
The prospect of cooperation also comes as Ankara expands its contacts with opposing factions, from Syria's new leadership to Lebanese political forces aligned with Tehran. For Hezbollah, maintaining channels with Turkiye could help prevent another hostile regional front from emerging while the movement remains under intense Israeli and American pressure.
Tripoli and the Sunni vacuum
While southern Lebanon presents Ankara with a difficult political landscape, Tripoli offers more familiar ground for its ambitions.
The northern city has longstanding historical, social, and cultural ties with Turkiye, making it an important entry point into Lebanon's Sunni political environment. Ankara has cultivated these connections through educational programs, development assistance, cultural initiatives, and humanitarian organizations.
Bilal Erdogan's planned itinerary reflects the breadth of this engagement. According
to Lebanese reporting, preparations include a large public gathering, a tour of the
city's historic neighborhoods, and announcements concerning the restoration of Ottoman-
Plans also involve expanding scholarship programs at private universities, strengthening educational links that could deepen Turkiye's relationship with younger generations of Lebanese students.
The proposed visit includes meetings with religious figures and officials responsible for the Port of Tripoli, the special economic zone, and the Rashid Karami International Fair. Turkish businesspeople and representatives of service industries are expected to accompany the delegation to discuss potential cooperation and investment.
These ambitions also coincide with a leadership vacuum within the country's Sunni political establishment. Saudi Arabia, traditionally a dominant external patron of Lebanese Sunni politics, has struggled to cultivate a figure capable of replacing former prime minister Saad Hariri since his withdrawal from political life.
Large sections of the Sunni population remain without a unifying political leadership, creating opportunities for other regional powers to build influence through local institutions, religious networks, and economic assistance.
Turkiye is seeking to capitalize on this opening, drawing on its ties with Islamist
movements, its position in Syria under self-
Tripoli's historical connections to the Ottoman Empire add another dimension to this strategy. The restoration of Ottoman landmarks and expansion of educational programs could cultivate a lasting cultural affinity with Turkiye while reinforcing its political and economic presence.
The city also occupies an important place in Ankara's wider Lebanese strategy, particularly through the development of northern transport links, commercial infrastructure, and potential connections with Syrian markets.
Baabda's rival partnerships
Ankara's efforts to expand its influence in Lebanon coincide with President Aoun's pursuit of closer ties with regional powers whose interests increasingly clash with Turkiye's.
Aoun has sought closer relations with the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and India, placing Lebanon within emerging economic and strategic networks that intersect with Israeli interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
These developments have raised concerns in Ankara, which views several regional projects involving Greece and Cyprus as competing with its own maritime and economic ambitions.
One of the clearest sources of tension was the maritime delimitation agreement signed between Lebanon and Cyprus on 26 November 2025, which entered into force on 26 February 2026.
Turkiye objected to the agreement, arguing that it disregarded the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Ankara maintains that the Greek Cypriot administration cannot conclude maritime arrangements on behalf of the entire island without accounting for the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community.
Lebanon, meanwhile, insisted that the agreement neither targeted nor excluded Turkiye, seeking to preserve its relations with Ankara while advancing its maritime cooperation with Cyprus.
Aoun's subsequent visit to Athens, where he discussed upgrading relations with Greece to a strategic partnership, added another dimension to the rivalry. Greece has also strengthened defense cooperation with Israel, bringing two of Ankara's eastern Mediterranean rivals into closer strategic alignment.
The competition also extends to regional trade routes. In October, the ports of Beirut and Tripoli joined the IMEC Ports Club, an initiative associated with the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
IMEC aims to strengthen commercial and logistical connections between India, West Asia, and Europe. Although membership of the Ports Club does not formally integrate Lebanon into the corridor, it could draw Beirut and Tripoli into a trade network competing with Turkish transport initiatives.
Ankara, meanwhile, has pursued alternative transport links through Turkiye and Syria, seeking to position itself at the center of trade between West Asia and Europe.
Despite these differences, Aoun has maintained direct relations with Ankara. During his visit to Turkiye in July, he emphasized cooperation in supporting the Lebanese army, economic recovery, and stability in southern Lebanon.
The Lebanese president also described coordination with Turkiye as a strategic necessity, acknowledging Ankara's regional weight even as Beirut deepens relations with other partners.
Salam caught between Ankara and the Gulf
Prime Minister Salam's dealings with Ankara have also drawn attention, particularly in the context of Beirut's relations with the Gulf monarchies.
Salam's absence from meetings with an Emirati economic delegation visiting Beirut in August prompted political speculation, particularly as Lebanon was attempting to revive commercial ties with the UAE.
Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri represented Salam at the economic forum held on 27 August. Lebanese reporting highlighted the prime minister's absence from meetings with the visiting business delegation, raising questions about the political significance of his schedule.
Other reports attributed his absence to his presence in Turkiye, citing sources close to the prime minister's office who maintained that logistical considerations, rather than opposition to the UAE, explained the situation.
The episode attracted attention because Salam had already established direct contact with President Erdogan. During a visit to Istanbul in July, the two discussed bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and security matters.
Their engagement continued in September, when Salam met Erdogan again in New York. Discussions included Turkish assistance with prefabricated housing, the return of displaced Lebanese residents, and reconstruction efforts in southern Lebanon.
Ankara maintains relations with Washington, exercises extensive influence in Syria, and has developed channels with Lebanese factions whose regional alliances often conflict. Its contacts with these opposing parties could prove valuable as Lebanon confronts the consequences of Israel's military campaign, its reconstruction crisis, and mounting international pressure over Hezbollah's weapons.
The battle for post-
Turkiye's ambitions in southern Lebanon have acquired greater urgency as UNIFIL approaches the end of its mission.
The UN Security Council decided that UNIFIL would cease operations on 31 December 2026, followed by a withdrawal process during 2027, prompting discussions over the international security arrangements that may replace the mission.
Ankara has openly expressed its willingness to contribute to post-
Turkiye has also pledged continued support for the Lebanese army, positioning itself as a potential partner in efforts to strengthen state security institutions.
The two countries already possess a framework for military cooperation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, a military framework agreement signed in 2010 provides the legal basis for cooperation involving training, technical assistance, grants, and exchanges between their armed forces.
The agreement could provide a basis for a greater Turkish military role, should Beirut agree.
Any Turkish involvement in post-
Ankara's diplomatic activity has already brought it into contact with some of the region's opposing forces. On 1 October, reports emerged of a secret meeting in Turkiye between representatives of Syria's new government and Hezbollah, reportedly organized through Turkish security and intelligence channels.
According to the accounts of officials familiar with the talks, the meeting was intended to reduce tensions between Damascus and Hezbollah following Assad's overthrow.
Both the Turkish presidency and the Syrian government subsequently denied the meeting took place. The report nevertheless reflected growing speculation about Ankara's possible role in contacts between Damascus and Hezbollah.
Turkiye played a central role in supporting the armed opposition that eventually toppled Assad. It is now seeking to consolidate its influence over the political and security consequences of that upheaval, including relations between Syria's new authorities and Hezbollah.
Lebanon occupies an important place in these calculations. Developments in Syria directly affect Hezbollah's security environment, while Turkish influence in Damascus gives Ankara additional leverage in discussions concerning Lebanon's borders, reconstruction, and future security arrangements.
Can Ankara secure both north and south?
Bilal Erdogan's proposed visit could bring Ankara's separate Lebanese initiatives into closer alignment.
Tripoli provides Ankara with an opportunity to strengthen its position within the
Sunni political environment through educational, cultural, commercial, and humanitarian
initiatives. Southern Lebanon presents a more sensitive prospect, requiring accommodation
with Amal and Hezbollah while opening the possibility of a Turkish role in reconstruction
and post-
Relations with the Lebanese presidency and government provide further access to state institutions, the army, and major economic projects, even as Beirut pursues partnerships with regional powers competing against Ankara.
The prospect of Bilal Erdogan visiting southern Lebanon is particularly significant. His arrival in an area long associated with Iranian influence and the resistance would signal Ankara's willingness to engage directly with forces whose regional positions have frequently clashed with its own.