Riyadh’s costly road to war

Saudi Arabia’s renewed confrontation with Yemen is exposing the limits of its defenses and threatening the economic ambitions it can scarcely afford to sacrifice.

27.10.2026

By Mawadda Iskandar

Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/riyadhs-costly-road-to-war

Saudi Arabia is paying for its wars far from the battlefield. Attacks on its oil facilities, airports, and military bases have put the kingdom’s defenses and economy under strain, even as Riyadh faces the prospect of another US-Israeli assault on Iran.

Against this backdrop, Tehran brought together officials from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkiye on 26 October to discuss regional security. The meeting comes as Riyadh's confrontation with Yemen remains unresolved, with attacks on vital infrastructure disrupting aviation and oil refining operations and adding to the kingdom's economic pressures.

Tehran has warned of a more severe response if war against it resumes, raising the possibility that attacks could expand to include energy facilities, data centers, undersea communications cables, water supplies, and other critical infrastructure across the Gulf. Riyadh must now weigh the mounting price of its regional policies against the alternative of de-escalation.

Iran strikes at the arteries

Gulf states hosting US military facilities suffered heavy material and economic losses from strikes on their territory and vital infrastructure between the outbreak of war on 28 February 2026 and the cessation of reciprocal attacks in late July.

The damage was not confined to US military bases, which were supposed to provide protection to these states, but extended to economic installations and facilities involved in the production, transportation, and export of energy. A Reuters investigation published on 15 October 2026 documented at least 135 missile and drone strikes against 84 infrastructure sites across seven countries in the region.

In Saudi Arabia, the strikes laid bare the limits of the US military umbrella. Prince Sultan Air Base in Al-Kharj was repeatedly targeted by Iranian strikes.

An investigation published by MeidasTouch in collaboration with the VALOR network revealed damage to an E-3 Sentry airborne early warning aircraft and KC-135 refueling aircraft, which play important roles in monitoring airspace, coordinating operations, and supporting aerial missions, as well as facilities used by US military personnel. The attacks also extended to diplomatic targets, including the US embassy in Riyadh.

The greatest pressure fell on Saudi Arabia’s energy sector, with attacks targeting oilfields, pumping stations, refineries, and export facilities. Strikes on the Manifa and Khurais facilities reduced production by approximately 600,000 barrels per day (bpd), while an attack on a pumping station along the East–West Pipeline reduced flows by around 700,000 bpd.

The pipeline is particularly important because it transports oil from eastern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allowing the kingdom to export oil without passing through the Strait of Hormuz when maritime traffic there is disrupted. The attacks also targeted the Shaybah oilfield in the Empty Quarter, one of Saudi Arabia’s major producing fields.

Refineries and gas processing plants were also hit, including Ras Tanura, SATORP in Jubail, SAMREF in Yanbu, and the Riyadh refinery, alongside gas processing facilities at Juaymah and petrochemical and electricity installations.

The Saudi Energy Ministry reported that these strikes affected refining operations and exports of refined products, as well as liquefied petroleum gas and natural gas liquids. The Jubail petrochemical complex was also targeted, including Sadara, the joint venture between Aramco and Dow, along with other facilities in the industrial zone.

In Yanbu, a drone attack on the Saudi Aramco Mobil refinery on 19 March reduced its output to approximately 70 percent of operating capacity until 9 April. Maritime traffic was also affected, with the oil tankers Widian and Sidr coming under attack while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

Yemen brings the war home

Even as the kingdom assessed its losses, Riyadh chose to escalate its confrontation with Yemen rather than implement the provisions of the roadmap or lift the blockade.

Between 13 July and 26 October, and following warnings, the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) announced attacks on aviation, military installations, and energy facilities, while also extending to maritime navigation. Their frequency increased considerably, as did the scope of their impact.

The Gulf Research Center recorded 82 attacks against Saudi Arabia between 13 July and 25 October, including 12 targeting airports and 10 targeting energy facilities. The number of attacks rose from four in July and seven in August to 17 in September, before surging to 54 between 1 and 25 October, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the recorded total.

The aviation campaign centered on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, which was repeatedly targeted with missiles and drones, alongside airports in Abha, Najran, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, and King Abdullah Airport in Jazan.

Targets also included radar installations on Mount Al-Hisn and Mount Al-Rahma, as well as positions at King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, including aircraft shelters, ammunition depots, and drone control centers. The Saudi Defense Ministry building in Riyadh was also among the declared targets.

The scale of the disruption is evident in data from aviation analytics company Cirium: approximately 45 percent of scheduled flights were canceled between 8 and 25 October, with cancellations peaking at more than 60 percent on 12 October.

King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh recorded the highest cancellation rate, at approximately 86 percent of scheduled flights, compared with 42 percent at Dammam and 46.7 percent at Abha. Scheduled flights at Najran were also canceled.

The disruption spread beyond the airports themselves. ACLED reported that airports in Riyadh, Jazan, Najran, Dammam, and Abha came under attack on at least six separate days, prompting international airlines to suspend flights to the capital.

Although King Khalid International Airport partially reopened on 25 October following a closure that began on 10 October, disruptions persisted, with international flight suspensions extended into November and Delta postponing the launch of its Riyadh route until March 2027.

Riyadh Air also evacuated its aircraft from the capital and relocated them to Jeddah, while plans to resume operations included transporting passengers to Qassim Airport and then onward to Riyadh by road, a journey of approximately four and a half hours.

The YAF also named energy targets, including Aramco facilities in Jazan, Yanbu, Najran, Abha, and Dhahran; the Rabigh refinery and a refinery in Riyadh; the Shedgum gas plant; the Tanajib oil facility; and the Shaybah oilfield, as well as crude oil pumping stations and the East–West Pipeline.

Yemeni military statements reported fires at several of these sites, including facilities in Yanbu, the Shaybah oilfield, and pumping stations.

Strikes and logistical bottlenecks also disrupted refining operations. The Wall Street Journal reported that attacks had forced Aramco's Jazan refinery, which has a capacity of approximately 400,000 bpd, offline.

Satellite images showing plumes of smoke near the Abqaiq facility raised questions about the safety of one of the kingdom's most important oil processing centers, which receives crude from the Ghawar field before directing it toward export facilities at Ras Tanura and Juaymah.

A drone attack also forced an 11-day shutdown of the strategic East–West Pipeline, further disrupting Saudi oil exports.

On the military front, the YAF reported strikes on positions and military camps in Sharurah, Jazan, and Asir, including the Al-Daghareer, Akifah, and Al-Mawsim camps, as well as weapons depots, command and control rooms, and military concentrations at various locations.

They also announced an attack on a Saudi naval task force camp, the destruction of a radar installation at Bir Askar, and a subsequent strike on the southern naval base of the Saudi Border Guard in Jazan. Regarding aerial losses, Yemeni forces announced the downing of a Saudi F-15 fighter jet over Marib, alongside the destruction of armed reconnaissance drones of the CH-4, Wing Loong II, Bayraktar Akinci, and Karyal types.

Across the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden, the YAF announced attacks on the Saudi oil tankers ENCELIA and LAYLA using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, claiming direct hits and fires aboard both vessels.

Saudi authorities confirmed that ENCELIA was struck and caught fire at the bow. They also announced attacks on other ships, including the tankers NCC GHAZAL, Wafa, Daisy, and Amzan, as well as a military landing vessel off the coast of Mokha, while forcing other ships to change course.

ACLED recorded attacks against 10 commercial vessels, most of them oil tankers, with at least six directly hit. Seven were Saudi-flagged or owned by Saudi companies, while another two were reported to have Saudi connections.

The following table summarizes the principal Saudi facilities and vessels targeted during the Iranian and Yemeni campaigns, along with their reported effects.

The economic toll

The blows to Saudi airports and infrastructure have been accompanied by mounting pressure on financial markets and the energy sector. On 25 October, the Saudi stock market index fell by approximately 2.7 percent, its worst session in 18 months, following eight consecutive weeks of decline. The market capitalization of listed shares also fell by approximately 114.6 billion riyals during the week ending 22 October, amid selling pressure that included foreign institutional investors.

In the energy sector, Saudi oil exports fell to approximately 3.2 million bpd in August, their lowest level in more than 13 years, before shipments increased in September as export routes were redirected toward the Red Sea.

The war has also coincided with growing fiscal pressures and higher living costs. Estimates of the 2026 budget deficit were raised from 165 billion riyals to approximately 245 billion riyals, while defense allocations reached around $83 billion.

Saudi Arabia also announced changes to electricity and water tariffs, due to take effect in January 2027, including higher electricity prices and even larger increases in water bills, adding to the financial burden on citizens.

The war is also threatening the investment and economic diversification plans on which Riyadh has staked its future. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that prolonged regional tensions could undermine investor confidence, delay projects, and complicate efforts to create jobs under the kingdom's Vision 2030 program.

The limits of Saudi air defenses

With targets scattered across the kingdom, Riyadh must protect its vital installations while conserving interceptor munitions, a challenge its existing air defenses have struggled to meet. The distance between airports, oil facilities, and military bases only deepens that dilemma.

According to an analysis by the Financial Times (FT), Saudi defenses are struggling to counter Yemeni attacks because of the diversity of weapons and targets involved. Drones are used to identify the positions and coverage of air defense systems, while low-flying cruise missiles are more difficult to detect and intercept.

Saudi Arabia's Patriot and THAAD systems cannot guarantee the interception of every incoming projectile. The challenge has grown more acute as months of Iranian and Yemeni attacks have depleted interceptor stocks, leaving Riyadh to defend widely dispersed facilities with increasingly strained resources.

As Yemeni strikes continue to drain its defenses, Riyadh has turned to foreign partners for military support. Saudi Arabia has also turned to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed with Pakistan and Turkiye, whose collective defense provisions have since been activated in response to Yemeni attacks. Egypt, meanwhile, has authorized President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to provide military support for the kingdom's defense.

Riyadh now faces a choice between prolonging a war that has exposed the limits of its military defenses and returning to a settlement with Sanaa. The longer the confrontation continues, the greater the damage to the economic ambitions on which the kingdom has staked its future.