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Turkiye’s new opposition: How lawfare gave rise to the New Party
A court-driven seizure of the CHP has redrawn Turkiye’s opposition map, but the New Party’s domestic ambitions remain tethered to the same western orientation it claims can deliver democratic renewal.
30.07.2026
By Fatih Yasli
Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiyes-new-opposition-how-lawfare-gave-rise-to-the-new-party
On 24 July, another party entered Turkiye’s political arena. Ozgur Ozel and 90 other lawmakers resigned from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and founded the New Party (YP), with Ozel as its chairman.
The YP became the main opposition the moment it was established. Its 91 seats make it the second-largest force in parliament, while only 44 lawmakers remain in the CHP. A large number of mayors, provincial and district officials, and hundreds of thousands of members are also expected to resign and join the new formation.
Polls already place it as the strongest rival to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
What drove Ozel and his allies to abandon the party they had led until only weeks ago? And what developments produced one of the most consequential political ruptures in Turkiye’s recent history?
The vote that revived the opposition
Three years ago, Turkiye held general elections in which AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was re-elected president, and his party again emerged as the largest in parliament. The result gave Erdogan and the AKP, already in power for 21 years, another five-year mandate.
The latest defeat upset the balance within the CHP and produced a broad consensus that its longtime leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, should resign. When Kilicdaroglu refused, the internal opposition began organizing to remove him through a party congress.
At the congress held on 4–5 November 2023, Ozgur Ozel – for years one of Kilicdaroglu’s closest associates – challenged him for the leadership. Backed by Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Ozel was elected CHP chairman.
The local elections that followed on 31 March 2024 became the new leadership’s first test, and Ozel’s CHP passed it decisively. For the first time since the AKP came to power in 2002, it was pushed into second place in a nationwide vote. The CHP, which had not finished first nationally since 1977, became the country’s leading party and took control of a broad network of municipalities.
After a relatively quiet eight months, the AKP began a longer-term process in response to its declining support and the CHP’s emergence as a credible alternative. This process of “de-electoralization” does not formally abolish elections. Instead, it renders them politically ineffective by eliminating rivals and constructing a controlled opposition.
The war on the municipalities
Operations were first launched against CHP-run municipalities, initially justified through allegations of “terror links” and “corruption.” Over time, the terrorism narrative receded while corruption allegations intensified. The campaign began with the detention of Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Ozer on 30 October 2024 and has continued ever since.
By late July 2026, the authorities had targeted dozens of CHP municipalities, while more than 30 opposition mayors had been arrested, removed from office, or replaced by state-appointed trustees. At least 20 remained behind bars. The precise totals vary according to whether temporary detentions, suspensions, releases, and trustee appointments are counted.
Among those imprisoned was Imamoglu, who was not only a mayor but also the CHP’s presidential candidate. Imamoglu was detained on 19 March 2025 and formally jailed four days later.
New cases continue to be filed against him, and he faces a growing list of charges. The prevailing expectation is that he will be convicted and banned from politics, preventing Erdogan’s strongest rival – and the candidate leading him in repeated polls – from contesting the next election.
Lawfare reaches the CHP itself
The de-electoralization drive did not stop with municipal officials or the opposition’s presidential candidate. On 21 May 2026, an Ankara appeals court issued an unprecedented “absolute nullity” ruling against the CHP congress that Kilicdaroglu lost and Ozel won in November 2023.
The court treated the congress as legally nonexistent, removed Ozel, and returned the party to Kilicdaroglu. In doing so, it intruded into terrain that had previously belonged to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) and the party’s own members.
For the next two months, Ozel, his allies, and the overwhelming majority of the CHP base pressed the Kilicdaroglu leadership to convene an urgent congress, calculating that they could retake the party through a new vote.
But Kilicdaroglu – widely seen by the public as having been restored to office as part of the government’s de-electoralization strategy – declined to set an immediate date and instead deferred the congress to an unspecified time.
The YP is the direct product of that assault on the main opposition. Targeted through lawfare – a political war waged through the courts – Ozel and his team resigned from the CHP and founded a new vehicle, while maintaining that they may one day return.
A left turn at home
During the party’s formation, some suggested that it would move closer to the center-right than the CHP. Its program showed otherwise. Under the slogan “We will change this dark order,” the YP adopted a social democratic and left-populist platform.
The “change of order” it promises does not, of course, mean overturning Turkish capitalism. Yet the program carries a clear popular and statist character. It rejects free-market fetishism, envisages active state intervention in the economy, places the public interest first, and emphasizes the welfare state, a fairer distribution of income, secure work, full employment, and the rights to housing and energy.
This popular-statist claim is framed through commitments to the rule of law, constitutional government, a return to the parliamentary system, the restoration of the separation of powers, a solution to the Kurdish question, active citizenship, the fight against corruption, guarantees for political freedoms, and stronger mechanisms for popular participation. Its stated aim is a Turkiye in which development and democracy reinforce one another.
The party deliberately chose 24 July as its founding date. The Treaty of Lausanne, which secured international recognition for the Republic of Turkiye after the victory of the National Struggle and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was signed on 24 July 1923.
The symbolism extended further. On the day the party was founded, Ozel attended Friday prayers at Ankara’s Haci Bayram Mosque before visiting the first parliament building. The gesture recalled Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s opening of the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (TBMM) in Ankara during the National Struggle, when Istanbul remained under occupation. Ataturk had deliberately scheduled the opening for a Friday and first prayed at the same mosque.
In keeping with those gestures, the party program claims the legacy of the National Struggle, the founding of the republic, Ataturk, and his six principles, positioning the YP as the CHP’s legitimate successor.
Bound to the western alliance
The YP’s domestic program, particularly on the economy, places it to the left of many European social democratic parties. The same cannot be said so easily of its foreign policy.
Like the ruling AKP, the YP locates Turkiye firmly inside the “western alliance.” It identifies the acceleration of EU accession and a more active role in NATO as central foreign policy goals, while promising relations with Russia and China based on “balance and equality.”
None of this is surprising. The CHP, from which the YP emerged, has historically placed membership in the western alliance at the center of its foreign policy outlook. Before the YP was founded, Ozel wrote articles for western establishment publications, including Newsweek, the Financial Times (FT), and Project Syndicate.
Ahead of the 7–8 July NATO summit in Ankara, he urged Turkiye’s western partners to treat democratic legitimacy as a security interest, arguing that authoritarian rule could destabilize the country and threaten NATO and regional security.
For now, the economy remains the priority for most voters in Turkiye, and foreign policy has less influence on electoral behavior. The program’s external orientation has therefore attracted little public debate.
Yet it will not be easy to pursue popular and statist policies at home without an independent and anti-imperialist foreign policy, particularly when the YP refuses to acknowledge the west’s declining power. The international system will not readily permit the economic transformation the party claims to seek.
For Turkiye to build an economic order based on planning, development, and the public interest rather than free-market dogma, a measure of distance from Europe and the US is an objective necessity.
At a time when the AKP government is preparing once again to place Turkiye’s geopolitical and military weight at the west’s disposal, treating the western alliance as a formula for salvation means failing to grasp the direction of events.
The central contradiction in the YP’s program therefore remains unresolved. How will it close the gap between its domestic and foreign policies? Time will show which side ultimately prevails.
The struggle after the split
The YP was born of necessity, as a direct consequence of the government’s de-electoralization strategy. Its founding comes as Turkiye passes through multiple crises, the ruling party loses its former hegemony, and the public searches for an alternative capable of delivering greater prosperity, equality, and justice.
The next phase will test both sides. The YP must organize, grow, win the public behind it, and establish itself as a genuine alternative to the government. The AKP, meanwhile, must decide how far it is prepared to extend its de-electoralization strategy against a new main opposition that can no longer be contained through control of the CHP.
Turkiye’s near future will be shaped by the difficult and far-reaching struggle between these two forces.
A court-
30.07.2026
By Fatih Yasli
Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiyes-
On 24 July, another party entered Turkiye’s political arena. Ozgur Ozel and 90 other lawmakers resigned from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and founded the New Party (YP), with Ozel as its chairman.
The YP became the main opposition the moment it was established. Its 91 seats make it the second-
Polls already place it as the strongest rival to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
What drove Ozel and his allies to abandon the party they had led until only weeks ago? And what developments produced one of the most consequential political ruptures in Turkiye’s recent history?
The vote that revived the opposition
Three years ago, Turkiye held general elections in which AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was re-
The latest defeat upset the balance within the CHP and produced a broad consensus that its longtime leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, should resign. When Kilicdaroglu refused, the internal opposition began organizing to remove him through a party congress.
At the congress held on 4–5 November 2023, Ozgur Ozel – for years one of Kilicdaroglu’s closest associates – challenged him for the leadership. Backed by Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Ozel was elected CHP chairman.
The local elections that followed on 31 March 2024 became the new leadership’s first test, and Ozel’s CHP passed it decisively. For the first time since the AKP came to power in 2002, it was pushed into second place in a nationwide vote. The CHP, which had not finished first nationally since 1977, became the country’s leading party and took control of a broad network of municipalities.
After a relatively quiet eight months, the AKP began a longer-
The war on the municipalities
Operations were first launched against CHP-
By late July 2026, the authorities had targeted dozens of CHP municipalities, while more than 30 opposition mayors had been arrested, removed from office, or replaced by state-
Among those imprisoned was Imamoglu, who was not only a mayor but also the CHP’s presidential candidate. Imamoglu was detained on 19 March 2025 and formally jailed four days later.
New cases continue to be filed against him, and he faces a growing list of charges. The prevailing expectation is that he will be convicted and banned from politics, preventing Erdogan’s strongest rival – and the candidate leading him in repeated polls – from contesting the next election.
Lawfare reaches the CHP itself
The de-
The court treated the congress as legally nonexistent, removed Ozel, and returned the party to Kilicdaroglu. In doing so, it intruded into terrain that had previously belonged to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) and the party’s own members.
For the next two months, Ozel, his allies, and the overwhelming majority of the CHP base pressed the Kilicdaroglu leadership to convene an urgent congress, calculating that they could retake the party through a new vote.
But Kilicdaroglu – widely seen by the public as having been restored to office as part of the government’s de-
The YP is the direct product of that assault on the main opposition. Targeted through lawfare – a political war waged through the courts – Ozel and his team resigned from the CHP and founded a new vehicle, while maintaining that they may one day return.
A left turn at home
During the party’s formation, some suggested that it would move closer to the center-
The “change of order” it promises does not, of course, mean overturning Turkish capitalism. Yet the program carries a clear popular and statist character. It rejects free-
This popular-
The party deliberately chose 24 July as its founding date. The Treaty of Lausanne, which secured international recognition for the Republic of Turkiye after the victory of the National Struggle and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was signed on 24 July 1923.
The symbolism extended further. On the day the party was founded, Ozel attended Friday prayers at Ankara’s Haci Bayram Mosque before visiting the first parliament building. The gesture recalled Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s opening of the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (TBMM) in Ankara during the National Struggle, when Istanbul remained under occupation. Ataturk had deliberately scheduled the opening for a Friday and first prayed at the same mosque.
In keeping with those gestures, the party program claims the legacy of the National Struggle, the founding of the republic, Ataturk, and his six principles, positioning the YP as the CHP’s legitimate successor.
Bound to the western alliance
The YP’s domestic program, particularly on the economy, places it to the left of many European social democratic parties. The same cannot be said so easily of its foreign policy.
Like the ruling AKP, the YP locates Turkiye firmly inside the “western alliance.” It identifies the acceleration of EU accession and a more active role in NATO as central foreign policy goals, while promising relations with Russia and China based on “balance and equality.”
None of this is surprising. The CHP, from which the YP emerged, has historically placed membership in the western alliance at the center of its foreign policy outlook. Before the YP was founded, Ozel wrote articles for western establishment publications, including Newsweek, the Financial Times (FT), and Project Syndicate.
Ahead of the 7–8 July NATO summit in Ankara, he urged Turkiye’s western partners to treat democratic legitimacy as a security interest, arguing that authoritarian rule could destabilize the country and threaten NATO and regional security.
For now, the economy remains the priority for most voters in Turkiye, and foreign policy has less influence on electoral behavior. The program’s external orientation has therefore attracted little public debate.
Yet it will not be easy to pursue popular and statist policies at home without an independent and anti-
For Turkiye to build an economic order based on planning, development, and the public interest rather than free-
At a time when the AKP government is preparing once again to place Turkiye’s geopolitical and military weight at the west’s disposal, treating the western alliance as a formula for salvation means failing to grasp the direction of events.
The central contradiction in the YP’s program therefore remains unresolved. How will it close the gap between its domestic and foreign policies? Time will show which side ultimately prevails.
The struggle after the split
The YP was born of necessity, as a direct consequence of the government’s de-
The next phase will test both sides. The YP must organize, grow, win the public behind it, and establish itself as a genuine alternative to the government. The AKP, meanwhile, must decide how far it is prepared to extend its de-
Turkiye’s near future will be shaped by the difficult and far-