The Trump doctrine: A new era for US policy in the Middle East
In place of a coherent strategy or vision, Trump's approach to the Middle East is driven by dramatic gestures, symbolic victories, and personal legacy
17.07.2025
By Giorgio Cafiero*
Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/trump-doctrine-new-era-us-policy-middle-east
Six months into US President Donald J. Trump’s second term, his leadership on the international stage has been erratic.
In the Middle East, the Trump administration’s approach appears to be profoundly influenced by the president’s distinctive temperament and personal relations with leaders.
Instead of reflecting a coherent strategic doctrine or a systematically articulated vision, this style is marked by unpredictability, reactive improvisation, and a heavy reliance on Trump’s own impulses.
What currently constitutes US policy toward the Middle East can best be characterised as a patchwork of isolated initiatives and transactional overtures, more reflective of short-term political theatrics than of long-term strategic planning.
While high-level declarations from the White House occasionally gesture toward overarching goals, they are seldom supported by detailed planning or operational continuity.
In place of a comprehensive strategy, the administration’s regional posture seems driven by a desire for dramatic gestures, symbolic victories, and personal legacy - elements that, while politically resonant, often fail to translate into durable outcomes or credible leadership on the international stage.
“The White House’s approach to the region is shaped fundamentally by Trump’s idiosyncrasies and his own ego that at the last moment can change 180 degrees,” said Dr Nader Hashemi, director of Georgetown University’s Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, in an interview with The New Arab.
Noting that Trump is “completely unpredictable and can change his mind at the drop of a hat,” he observed that “one of the unique aspects of American foreign policy under Trump is it is completely incoherent and completely unpredictable”.
Trump seems to lack any overall strategy or strategic vision for the Middle East with the president mostly “concerned about his own legacy, [ensuring] support for Israel, and ideally [being] the one who solved the ‘Iran issue,’” Dr Sina Azodi, assistant professor of Middle East Politics at George Washington University, told TNA.
“I think he would like to see the expansion of the Abraham Accords, but he lacks the vision,” he added.
The broad US foreign policy consensus
Despite Trump’s unconventional nature and distinctive style, US foreign policy in the Middle East has largely adhered to the longstanding consensus of the Washington establishment with him in the Oval Office.
He is maintaining key pillars of American engagement in the region, including virtually unconditional support for Israel, close relationships with the Gulf Arab monarchies, and an obsession with confronting Iran.
“The Trump administration's Middle East policy appears to show more continuity than change from its predecessors, which can be summed up as a blank check for Israel to do whatever it wants regardless of threats to regional stability or international law,” Dr Assal Rad, non-resident fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, told TNA.
“Much like the Biden administration, which claimed to work for a ceasefire in Gaza but allowed Israel to act with impunity and supported its invasion of Lebanon, the Trump administration is letting Israel dictate US policy,” she added.
The bold and reckless decision to bomb Iran
What arguably distinguishes the current administration from its predecessors is Trump’s unprecedented willingness to employ direct military force against Iran - an act that no previous American president had dared to undertake. Those administrations saw an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as too risky.
Nonetheless, Trump’s decision to conduct strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites during last month’s 12-day Iran-Israel war was not entirely outside Washington’s policy framework.
For decades, American leaders, including President Barack Obama, issued veiled threats, constantly warning Tehran that “all options are on the table”. Trump, by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, breathed life into a policy course that neoconservative voices in Washington had championed for decades - one that dispensed with diplomacy.
Speaking to TNA, Dr Karim Emile Bitar, lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris, explained that we are now in the age of machtpolitik, or power politics.
This goes beyond realpolitik - widely understood as an approach to politics that is practical and focused on concrete particulars while cutting through idealism, ideology, utopianism, and naivety. “It’s a politics of strength. It’s the politics of might always taking precedence over right,” he commented.
Trump embodies the Jacksonian tradition as the US commander-in-chief, argues Dr Bitar. Named after President Andrew Jackson, Jacksonians are, at their core, nationalist populists driven by a deep conviction in “American exceptionalism”.
In contrast to neoconservatives, Jacksonians reject the notion that the US bears a moral obligation to spread so-called “American” or “universal” values abroad. While not inherently isolationist, Jacksonians tend to engage in foreign affairs only when they perceive a direct and substantial threat to the American homeland or to “American exceptionalism”.
“What is interesting with Donald Trump is that, contrary to the neo-conservatives, he does not even pay lip service to lectures about the so-called freedom agenda, democracy promotion, or human rights. He simply doesn’t care about that. So, Trump is not a neo-conservative,” Dr Bitar told TNA.
At the same time, though Trump has shown little hesitation in wielding force, he has signalled a reluctance to fully disregard the segment of his base which opposes perpetual foreign conflicts.
“This is why after 12 days he sent a clear message to Bibi Netanyahu in capital letters on Truth Social, signed President of the United States, and basically ordering Bibi Netanyahu to stop this war, while only a couple of days earlier Trump had floated the idea of regime change in Iran,” explained Dr Bitar.
“I don’t think he is necessarily in favour of [Iranian] regime change, unlike the Israelis. Jacksonians prefer to use a big stick to get behaviour modification, rather than to engage in experimentations and try to export Jeffersonian democracy.”
In terms of what comes next for the Trump administration’s Iran foreign policy, the Iran-Israel war rests uneasily upon a fragile and opaque ceasefire.
“Given Trump’s deep aversion to being dragged into long wars, which remains perhaps the one consistent through-line of his approach to the region, there is likely to be an ongoing preference for using sanctions, diplomatic bluster, and selective airstrikes as a means to keep pressure on Iran’s nuclear ambitions without committing US ground forces or sustained nation-building resources,” said Dr Andreas Krieg, associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, in a TNA interview.
“However, because there is no coherent policy apparatus beneath this high-level posture, the approach will almost certainly oscillate.”
Should figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio succeed in shaping the discourse with the Trump administration, we may witness a renewed drive for regime-destabilising pressure or even overt acts of sabotage targeting Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
Conversely, the MAGA-aligned faction, which includes figures such as Vice President JD Vance, maintains deep scepticism of protracted military entanglements in the Middle East.
Should economic strain or electoral calculus intensify, there could be a swift pivot toward negotiating a deal with the Islamic Republic that Trump would present as a grandiose deal but ultimately be more symbolic, cosmetic, and geared towards optics.
“Absent a structured diplomatic channel or serious verification mechanisms, the Iran nuclear file will likely drift along in a state of pressured limbo, punctuated by periodic escalations or symbolic negotiations that serve primarily to maintain the appearance of Trump ‘winning,’ rather than crafting a durable strategic framework,” said Dr Krieg in a TNA interview.
However, Dr Hashemi told TNA that he thinks “effectively negotiations are over because of Trump’s bombing of Iran”. Tehran has indicated a willingness to reengage in negotiations - but only on terms that now carry a significantly higher price.
“In other words, Iran is not going to show up at the negotiating table unless they can get guarantees that the United States will not bomb them again, and I don’t think that’s a guarantee that Donald Trump is willing to give,” said Dr Hashemi.
“This will set in motion, I think, a series of events that will eventually guarantee that Iran will be a nuclear weapons state within five years.”
Gaza
In Gaza, US policy under Trump’s second term reveals no discernible shift toward a substantive or sustained diplomatic initiative. The administration remains steadfastly aligned with Israel’s prerogative to dismantle Hamas, offering unwavering rhetorical and political support.
This posture, notably devoid of nuance, reflects a broader unwillingness to engage with the root causes.
Earlier this month, there was growing optimism about the US, Egypt, and Qatar successfully brokering a new Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Yet, such hopes have faded.
As Dr Hashemi commented, “everything that we’ve seen from Trump and Netanyahu suggests that the plan very much is to expel the Palestinians and to create a ‘Riviera’ on the Mediterranean”.
He noted that the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is part and parcel of this plan to lure starving Gazans to the Egyptian border, put them effectively in a concentration camp, and then expel them across the border when the timing is right”.
As Dr Bitar commented, even if Trump himself is not continuing his rhetoric about the “Riviera” on the Mediterranean, the political establishment in Israel has essentially adopted the idea, and Tel Aviv is moving ahead with it.
“I wouldn’t be surprised to see the US greenlighting this and putting pressure on Egypt so that Egypt at the end of the day ends up accepting huge sums of money from the US, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - we’re talking about tens of billions of dollars - and [agreeing] to take in hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and they will of course present it as some sort of a humanitarian gesture,” he said in a TNA interview.
Ultimately, without Washington reining in Israel or forcing the country to face any accountability for its crimes in Gaza, there is no reason to expect any change in Gaza for the better.
Without any coherent American strategy for Palestinian political reconciliation - let alone a credible roadmap to statehood - the result is a grim stalemate that “leaves Gaza locked in a cycle of destruction and fragile truces, with Washington exerting little meaningful influence beyond greenlighting Israeli preferences,” as Dr Krieg put it.
Syria
Heavily focused on expanding the Abraham Accords and further eroding Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant, the Trump administration has put much energy into Syria while seeing the country as a theatre of opportunity.
By lifting stringent Assad-era sanctions on post-regime change Syria and revoking Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) designation, the Trump administration has managed to draw Damascus much closer to the orbit of the Transatlantic Alliance and Gulf Cooperation Council states, chiefly Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
True to Trump’s deal-making ethos, the new US influence in Damascus is being leveraged to cajole Damascus toward the Israeli normalisation camp - an ambition that, if realised, could mark a geopolitical sea change in the Levant, given the decades-old history of Syria and Israel officially being at war.
To Trump, Syria is no longer a pariah state to be quarantined, but a potential pivot point in a broader US-led regional reordering in line with the quest to expand the Abraham Accords.
Yet, Israel, in a move likely to further dim prospects for regional stability and complicate the normalisation question, bombed Syria’s army headquarters in Damascus on 16 July. The assault comes amid escalating clashes in the southern city of Suweida, where government forces and Bedouin fighters have been locked in a multi-day confrontation with Druze militias.
Despite requests from the Trump administration to halt military operations in southern Syria, Israel pressed ahead, underscoring Tel Aviv’s determination to exploit Syria’s fragile transition and keep significant portions of the country beyond the Sharaa government’s control to further fragment the country.
How the White House responds will speak volumes about the true state of US-Syria relations and how much the relatively new Damascus government’s cordial relationship with the Trump administration can help Syria restore national cohesion and defend its sovereignty.
Though with Israeli normalisation extremely unpopular among Syrian citizens, especially in the aftermath of Israel’s ongoing military operations against targets in the country since Assad’s ouster on 8 December 2024, Damascus joining the Abraham Accords could easily become a driver of domestic instability.
Widespread public opposition to that move, especially given the fact that Israel would not end its illegal occupation of the Golan Heights in exchange for formalised diplomatic relations with Damascus, could severely cost Sharaa his legitimacy at home.
Entering the Abraham Accords from a position of weakness could be viewed by Syrian citizens not as a bold step toward regional reintegration but rather as a humiliating capitulation that undermines Syria’s territorial integrity and national dignity.
For Sharaa, whose legitimacy still rests on a fragile foundation, the political costs of Israeli normalisation could be substantial. Without broad-based public support, bringing Syria into the Abraham Accords may prove not only divisive but also destabilising, threatening to erode the very political capital Sharaa’s government seeks to consolidate.
Yemen's Houthi rebels
Yemen occupies a peripheral, if not marginal, position in the strategic calculus of the Trump administration, acknowledged primarily through the prism of countering Iranian influence. Rather than being approached as a multifaceted conflict rooted in local grievances, governance vacuums, and long-standing tribal divisions, the Yemeni file is often reduced to a “proxy” struggle involving Tehran.
“The Trump administration's policy in Yemen has featured three characteristics similar to that of its predecessors: a lack of coherence, a lack of clear and achievable goals, and the reality that this Yemen policy is largely guided by other priorities, not by Yemen itself, especially the management of relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia,” Dr Thomas Juneau, associate professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, told TNA.
“In Trump's case, what is he trying to achieve with the Houthis? If he wants to defeat them, this is not an achievable goal given the resources he seems willing to commit. If the goal is to contain them, it has so far not succeeded, as witnessed by their continued attacks in the Red Sea. Like his predecessor, Trump has also failed, so far at least, at finding a way to strengthen anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, which remain weak and divided,” he added.
Such an approach risks overlooking the distinctly Yemeni dimensions of the crisis. The complex interplay of sectarian identity, historical marginalisation, economic collapse, and fragmented political authority has created a conflict far more intricate than a simple extension of Iranian ambition. Yet there is little to indicate that the administration is prepared to engage with these deeper layers.
Moreover, the absence of sustained institutional engagement - whether through diplomatic channels, interagency coordination, or multilateral initiatives - underscores the degree to which Yemen is treated as a secondary theatre.
Episodic measures, such as limited naval deployments to protect shipping lanes or the sale of military hardware to Gulf partners, have become the primary instruments of American involvement. While such actions may serve immediate security interests, they do little to contribute to a long-term resolution or the stabilisation of Yemen’s fractured political landscape.
A visionless US Middle East policy
In sum, the White House’s Middle East policy is largely improvisational in execution - grand in rhetoric, theatrical in gesture, yet strikingly devoid of institutional coherence or long-term design.
It is a policy architecture built on spectacle, in which we see high-profile deals, calibrated shows of force, and headline-grabbing moves that often lack the scaffolding of sustained interagency coordination or disciplined strategic planning. This is a foreign policy where performative posturing frequently substitutes for durable outcomes.
“While the administration is happy to sell more arms to the region, officials do not appear to envision a stronger leadership role for the US. Trump is his own best restrainer, willing to take a quick punch at a foe, then happily fall back and observe the results,” Charles Dunne, senior non-resident fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, told TNA.
As the administration enters a new phase of regional engagement, it remains difficult to envision a comprehensive strategy capable of moving beyond episodic assertion and into the realm of sustained, principled statecraft.
As Dr Krieg concluded, the consequence is the Middle East becoming “a region that is neither stabilising under American stewardship nor fully cut loose from US interference - caught instead in a pattern of bombast, selective coercion, and fragile deals that do little to resolve underlying conflicts”.
*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero