Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria

27.01.2026

By Gönül Tol

Gönül Tol is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Source:https://mei.edu/publication/ankaras-double-win-kurds-israel-and-the-new-syria/

After a year of talks mediated by the United States failed to persuade the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — a Kurdish-led militia that controls autonomous civilian and military institutions in Syria’s northeast — to dismantle those structures and integrate into the Syrian state, long-simmering tensions with Damascus boiled over, leading to a rapid shift in dynamics on the ground. Over the past two weeks, government forces have seized large swathes of northern and eastern Syria from the SDF, retaking two key Arab-majority provinces, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. The offensive brought major oil fields, hydroelectric dams, and detention facilities holding Islamic State (ISIS) fighters and affiliated civilians back under state control, significantly consolidating President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s authority.

A four-day cease-fire between the Syrian government and the SDF agreed on January 20 has been extended by 15 days, giving the group time to disarm and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army — or to resume fighting. Whether the truce holds or collapses will have major implications for neighboring Turkey, which has long-standing interests in Syria, but recent developments already point to a win for Ankara. From Turkey’s perspective, post-Bashar al-Assad Syria presented two immediate challenges: Kurdish autonomy along its southern border and Israeli actions that Ankara believed undermined its goals. The latest shifts suggest that Tom Barrack, President Donald Trump’s ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria, helped tilt the balance in Turkey’s favor on both fronts.

Turkey’s twin problems in post-Assad Syria

Since its creation in 2015, the US-backed SDF has been viewed by Ankara as a national security threat. The dominance of groups linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organization, within the SDF prompted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to accuse the US, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, of arming Turkey’s archenemy. US-SDF cooperation strained Ankara’s relations with Washington, fueled anti-American sentiment in Turkey, and intensified nationalist fears in the country that the Kurds were building a state on its border with US support. Erdoğan leveraged this dynamic — along with the emergence of Kurdish self-rule in Syria — to pursue a hardline anti-Kurdish agenda and forge an alliance with the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP), a partnership that enabled his long-sought shift to an all-powerful executive presidency.

Today, the fate of the SDF and Kurdish autonomy are once again tightly bound to Erdoğan’s domestic calculus. He has launched a new initiative involving the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, aimed at dismantling the organization following its announcement last May that it would disarm. The initiative is driven primarily by the need to secure pro-Kurdish parliamentary backing to allow him to run for president again in 2028, despite constitutional limits. The success of that effort hinges on the dissolution of the SDF and the unraveling of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

Ankara also saw Israel’s expanded military footprint in Syria after Assad’s fall as an obstacle to achieving its objectives. Beyond concerns that Israeli operations were further destabilizing the country, Turkish officials worried that the continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would reduce pressure on Syrian Kurds to compromise with Damascus. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan repeatedly suggested that the SDF was stalling on implementing the agreement reached on March 10, 2025, to integrate its forces into the Syrian national army, believing Israel would back them — much as the Israeli government has supported the Druze in southern Syria.

At the same time, Turkey moved to expand its own military footprint in post-Assad Syria, including exploring a joint defense arrangement that could enable the establishment of new Turkish bases in the center of the country and the deployment of radar systems on its territory. Israeli officials strongly opposed the radar plan, arguing it would sharply constrain Israel’s freedom of movement in Syrian airspace and potentially hinder its ability to conduct operations beyond the country, including against targets in Iran. Last April, Ankara reportedly evaluated at least three Syrian airbases for potential deployment, sites that Israel later targeted with airstrikes. Defense Minister Israel Katz described those strikes as a warning that Israel would not allow its security to be compromised, while Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar accused Turkey of seeking to establish a “Turkish protectorate” in Syria.

Problems solved?

The Syrian government’s recent military offensive has left the SDF in a precarious position. Thousands of its Arab recruits have defected, accelerating the group’s collapse, while it has lost large swathes of territory it controlled for nearly a decade. Its units are set to be dismantled, its fighters absorbed into the Syrian army with no Kurdish-majority formations, and the autonomous administration it built during the war against ISIS folded into the new state. Washington no longer appears to see the SDF as central to its regional strategy: US Special Envoy for Syria Barrack has said the group’s original mission has “largely expired” and that the Kurds’ best hope now lies with President Sharaa’s government.

Although Israel was never likely to support the SDF the way it has Syria’s Druze, on whose behalf it intervened against Damascus last summer, SDF figures the author spoke with nonetheless hoped that even the possibility of Israeli involvement might deter a military campaign by the Syrian government and Turkey-backed forces. Israel’s decision to stay on the sidelines during Damascus’s recent operations has now removed that illusion, making clear to Syrian Kurds that Israel will not get involved directly.

Taken together, this leaves the SDF with several grim choices. If, after the two-week cease-fire deadline expires, it opts to resume fighting, Syrian forces are likely to overrun the remaining SDF-held territory, with Kurdish civilians caught in the crossfire and little prospect of meaningful international protection. If the SDF instead accepts Damascus’s terms, it will effectively be acquiescing to the end of the experiment in Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

What does all of this mean for Ankara’s effort to dismantle the PKK? After the Syrian government moved against the SDF, Kurds in Turkey took to the streets following a call by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti), the country’s third-largest political faction. Clashes with police ensued, prompting some DEM officials the author spoke with to declare that the “peace process” with the PKK is dead. That judgment, however, is premature.

The talks with PKK leader Öcalan have been conducted largely without meaningful input from DEM or the broader Kurdish public, and Öcalan is likely to stay the course so long as violence against Kurds does not spiral out of control. He long ago abandoned demands for Kurdish statehood or territorial autonomy, instead advocating for “democratic local governance.” After the March 10 agreement between Damascus and the SDF — meant to pave the way for the integration of SDF military and civilian structures into Syrian state institutions — Öcalan pressed the SDF to implement it.

The terms now being offered by Damascus are far less favorable, and President Sharaa’s decree recognizing Kurdish rights, citizenship, and language has drawn criticism from Kurdish actors who want constitutional guarantees instead. Even so, Öcalan’s pragmatism remains central. His own interests are tied to the continuation of talks: Imprisoned on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara since 1999, he stands to gain improved conditions and reduced isolation.

Recently released minutes from November meetings between Öcalan and visiting delegations underscore this pragmatism. According to redacted transcripts, even as Damascus was attacking the SDF, Öcalan continued to push for PKK disarmament and appeared resigned to Syrian Kurds giving up autonomy in favor of integration into national institutions. At the same time, recent developments have revealed that Öcalan’s leverage is weaker than Ankara initially assumed. Despite his pressure, the SDF delayed implementing the March 10 agreement. Two Kurdish officials told the author he now faces growing criticism from the Kurdish public, a significant portion of which had hoped the talks with Ankara would help Syrian Kurds preserve the gains they made during the war. All of this suggests one outcome is most likely: Barring a major escalation of violence against Kurds, Öcalan will continue to back the disarmament talks.

Öcalan’s continued commitment to disarmament — and the collapse of the SDF along with Kurdish autonomy — effectively resolves Erdoğan’s “Kurdish problem” in Syria. On the “Israel problem,” Ankara also believes its hand has been strengthened, largely thanks to Ambassador Barrack. A Turkish official told the author that Ankara coordinated with Barrack ahead of the offensive to ensure Israel would not intervene to protect the SDF. Barrack may also be tilting the balance toward Turkey on other priorities. Turkey recently deployed an advanced radar system at Damascus International Airport — the HTRS-100 air traffic control radar produced by Turkish defense firm ASELSAN. Turkey’s ambassador to Syria, Nuh Yılmaz, described it as a major infrastructure upgrade for the capital’s main aviation hub. While Turkish officials insist the system is for civilian use, Israeli officials worry it could still constrain Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian airspace.

The cease-fire between Damascus and the Kurds comes at a sensitive moment for Israel, as talks over a potential security arrangement with Syria have resumed. After a two-month impasse, senior Israeli, Syrian, and US officials reconvened in Paris on January 6 and agreed to establish a joint mechanism — a dedicated communication center to enable ongoing coordination on intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomacy, and commercial issues under US supervision. Despite this progress, major gaps remain between the two sides. President Sharaa is demanding Israel’s full withdrawal from the buffer zone and the Syrian side of Mount Hermon — steps Israel sees as especially difficult, particularly regarding Hermon. But recent developments in Syria have strengthened Sharaa’s hand, and he appears to enjoy Trump’s backing. Turkish officials believe that with Sharaa and Turkey gaining ground — and Washington seemingly aligned — Israel may find it harder to resist US pressure to compromise.

From Ankara’s perspective, once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence in Syria — Israel in the south, Turkey in the north — is acceptable, perhaps even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift to Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria. If Israel stays, Damascus may feel more exposed and therefore more inclined to deepen cooperation with Turkey. This is the dilemma Israeli decision-makers now face as they weigh their next moves in Syria.