The Iran war's lasting impact on the Middle East

With no clear victor, the Iran war has accelerated a shift in Middle East geopolitics, weakening old assumptions about power, deterrence, and security

15.04.2026

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/iran-wars-lasting-impact-middle-east

The future of the Pakistan-brokered ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran remains deeply uncertain.

Whether it marks a fleeting pause in what may prove to be a protracted conflict, or the first fragile step toward a durable peace, is a question that only time will answer.

Yet the latter demands a degree of optimism expressed by few analysts, especially in light of the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz taking effect.

What can be said with greater confidence is that, whenever this war reaches its end, it will leave behind a transformed Middle East, even if it is too early to realise the contours of that new regional order.

Since the outbreak of war on 28 February, Iran has suffered profound and far-reaching damage to its economy, military capabilities, and critical infrastructure.

What had been built over decades has been eroded under American and Israeli strikes, reversing years of development in a matter of weeks.

“Assuming financial resources could be harnessed, it will take Iran at least a decade to rebuild what has been destroyed,” said Dr Shireen Hunter, an honorary fellow at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University who served as an Iranian diplomat before 1979, in an interview with The New Arab.

She also noted an overall weakening of Iran in relation to its neighbours - chiefly Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia - adding that “Iran's regional and international role will be further diminished” as a consequence of this war.

Iran's resilience under sustained pressure

Yet, as the underdog throughout this conflict, Iran has demonstrated a resilience that few observers anticipated at this war’s outset. In doing so, Tehran has dispelled the notion that it is merely a “paper tiger.”

It is now evident that US President Donald Trump misjudged the extent to which regional and domestic pressures since 2024 had eroded Iran’s strength, underestimating both the Islamic Republic’s capacity to endure and its ability to adapt under sustained strain.

“Iran is much stronger than the United States and its allies are willing to acknowledge,” Dr Rouzbeh Parsi, an affiliated researcher at Lund University, told TNA, adding that Tehran has “very clear and potent countermeasures for any future military conflict with Israel and the United States.”

As he put it, “The Trump administration's insistence on the maximalist, unconditional surrender kind of demands in Islamabad is explained by the fact that they still think it’s 27 February - i.e. US military might is feared and not yet tested, and Iran is weak and defenceless.”

Israel did much to push this idea, which Trump naively believed, that the Islamic Republic is weak to the point that “Iran could be finished with one final blow,” said Negar Mortazavi, a Washington-based Iranian journalist, host of The Iran Podcast, and senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, in a TNA interview. “It has turned out to be completely false for many reasons.”

Emphasising how Tehran understands itself as being on the defensive in this war while resisting American-Israeli aggression, she told TNA that Iran has “put up a pretty fierce fight”.

However, for all the extensive damage inflicted by American and Israeli forces across Iran, it is equally important to acknowledge their failure to secure a decisive victory.

This truth lays bare the inherent limits of even overwhelming conventional military superiority - an advantage which has not translated into a definitive strategic resolution, underscoring a significant gap between the capacity to destroy and the ability to achieve lasting political outcomes.

“It is absolutely clear that Iran, with its missile programme and drones, can effectively counter American military power by exactly inflicting economic and political pain - the [classic] underdog/guerrilla approach. Iran cannot match the United States militarily, but it can try to exact a forbidding price on Washington,” explained Dr Parsi.

Costs on the Iranian and American sides

It is difficult to construe Iran’s performance in this war as an outright victory for Tehran. As Dr Hunter observes, both Iran and the United States emerge diminished by this brutal conflict. Iran’s losses are evident in the severe toll exacted on its economy and military since late February.

But the consequences will extend further. In the aftermath, Tehran may find itself increasingly vulnerable to pressure from regional rivals, which she believes may move decisively to exploit Iran’s internal fissures, particularly ethnic tensions.

Meanwhile, Washington is a loser in this war because the US, despite being the world’s most powerful military power, has “failed to bring Iran down to its knees,” according to Dr Hunter.

“The US can destroy all of Iran, but it cannot open the Strait of Hormuz. Sinking only one or two ships could close the strait forever. In other words, there is no military solution to the opening of the strait. It has also failed to destroy the Iranians' loyalty to their now devastated country. This has shown that you cannot change minds by the use of force,” she added.

Fraying of US global leadership and credibility

At the same time, it is difficult to dispute the fact that this illegal war of choice has severely damaged the United States’ global standing, prestige, and credibility.

Although the relative decline of US hegemony was already in motion prior to Trump’s second term, Dr Parsi holds that no American president has undermined Washington’s position on the international stage as much as Trump.

“It was already going downhill with his first presidency and the way he played with Ukraine and NATO and continued the Biden administration’s carte blanche for Israel’s genocide in Gaza. But I think his inability to formulate anything that looks like a reasonable strategy where he could bring his military superiority to bear and therefore now not been able to suppress or vanquish a [third-rate] military power like Iran says a lot.”

This war has placed the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members under extraordinary pressure. Iran’s missile and drone strikes targeting Gulf Arab countries have generated unprecedented security crises and a host of dilemmas to which there are no easy solutions for policymakers in GCC states.

The Gulf Arab monarchies’ close partnerships with Washington will not unravel as a result of the conflict. In fact, in some cases, most notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE), relations with the United States appear set to deepen due to their heightened threat perceptions of Iran.

Even so, the longstanding assumption of an American security umbrella as fully reliable and unconditional has been weakened to an extremely significant degree.

It is important to recognise that doubts about the United States’ commitment to Gulf security did not originate with this war. Earlier episodes, including the 2019 Saudi Aramco attacks, the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi, and subsequent Iranian and Israeli aggression against Qatar in 2025, had already contributed to growing unease regarding Washington’s willingness and ability to defend its allies and partners in the GCC.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which the current conflict has intensified Gulf Arab officials’ reassessments of the credibility and reliability of the American security umbrella.

Within the Gulf, there is an increasingly widespread perception that the United States, particularly under the current administration, has prioritised Israel’s objectives over the GCC states’ core interest in regional stability. This perception will complicate Washington’s relations with its Gulf partners.

Although the precise nature of any post-conflict recalibration among GCC members remains to be seen, it is likely that Gulf Arab-American relations will enter a new phase defined by greater hedging and a more cautious approach to engagement, as regional states adapt to an increasingly erratic US foreign policy.

“The war has damaged the US claim to moral leadership, and it has put more strain on relations with traditional allies in Europe. It has also somewhat undermined Arabs' belief that the US can solve their Iran problem without any harm to themselves,” Dr Hunter told TNA.

“The fact that the decision to go to war was because of Israeli pressure, especially Netanyahu’s, raised the issue of who is the real superpower, the US or Israel, and who is making America's Middle East policy,” she added.

A contested order

Looking ahead, the uncertain trajectory of this Pakistani-brokered ceasefire leaves the Middle East in a state of limbo.

Regardless of how, when, or if the war restarts, it is clear that all the parties to this conflict have suffered serious losses, and this conflict will probably reshape the Middle East in many ways that are yet to be recognised.

In the emerging post-conflict order, with shifting alliances and revisited security assumptions, China’s decision to remain on the sidelines may ultimately prove to be advantageous to Beijing.

As GCC members and other states in the region and beyond reassess the reliability of their longstanding dependence on the United States, China may be positioned to consolidate greater geopolitical influence while maintaining its non-interventionist posture.

In this shifting environment, China’s geopolitical clout in the Middle East is likely to grow.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle