Maliki's comeback: A high-stakes test for Iraq's future

Maliki's potential return to power highlights both Iraq's entrenched political complexities and the wider power struggles shaping the Middle East

03.02.2026

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/malikis-comeback-high-stakes-test-iraqs-future

Last month, Iraq's Coordination Framework made a striking choice to nominate former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to reclaim the country’s top leadership position.

The announcement has sparked a firestorm of reactions, both within Iraq and abroad, as Maliki, the first elected Iraqi prime minister since Saddam’s fall in 2003 and the only one to serve two terms (2006-14), remains a deeply polarising figure.

While the 75-year-old’s return to power is not yet a certainty, the odds are good that he will once again assume the prime ministership. Should that happen, it will occur amid a persistent political crisis in Iraq that will test Baghdad’s ability to assert its sovereignty in the face of internal divisions and rising external pressures.

The Coordination Framework, which commands a majority in Iraq's parliament, is a broad Shia alliance encompassing the Fatah Alliance, the State of Law Coalition, the Alliance of National State Forces, and the Ata Movement.

Within this coalition lie several pro-Iranian factions, including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr Organisation. For many, both within Iraq and beyond, the Coordination Framework's decision to back Maliki is seen as a clear reinstatement of the "Iranian choice" for prime minister.

This perception is hardly surprising, given Maliki's history of seeking refuge in Iran after fleeing Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as his tenure in office, during which he notably deepened Iraq's alignment with Tehran. Such connections have fuelled widespread scepticism about his capacity to govern independently of Iranian influence.

Tehran’s swift endorsement of a third term for Maliki - hailed by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked media as "anti-American" - therefore comes as no surprise.

Indeed, Iran’s enthusiastic backing has added a layer of complexity for those within Iraq who wish to present the decision as a purely Iraqi one, free from external interference.

This support from Tehran not only underscores the deep ties between the two nations but also complicates efforts to portray Maliki’s candidacy as a reflection of Iraq’s sovereign political will.

Critics of Maliki’s potential third term are quick to highlight the sectarian violence and terrorism that ravaged Iraq throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

Maliki’s policies, often viewed as deeply antagonistic to the Sunni population, have led many in Iraq and the wider region to hold him partly responsible for the conditions that facilitated the rapid rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014.

While the degree to which Maliki himself is to blame, rather than the broader sectarian dynamics that shaped Iraq's political landscape at the time, remains a subject of intense debate, there is little doubt that his leadership during this tumultuous period remains highly contentious.

Washington's stand against Maliki's return

Determined to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, the Trump administration adopted a resolute position against Maliki’s potential return to power.

Late last month, President Donald Trump issued a stark warning to Baghdad, making it clear that US support for Iraq would be withdrawn should Maliki assume the prime ministership once more.

Criticising Maliki’s "insane policies and ideologies," Trump stated, “Last time Maliki was in power, the country descended into poverty and total chaos. That should not be allowed to happen again”.

Echoing this sentiment, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani that “a government controlled by Iran cannot successfully put Iraq's own interests first, keep Iraq out of regional conflicts or advance the mutually beneficial partnership between the US and Iraq”.

Maliki has forcefully rejected these criticisms, denouncing the US warnings as an illegitimate interference in Iraq's internal affairs by a foreign power.

His stance is shared by a number of Iraqi figures, including some who are not aligned with the Islamic Republic, who have expressed concern that yielding to such external pressure undermines Iraq's sovereignty.

These voices emphasise the necessity of asserting national independence in the face of foreign influence. At the same time, within Baghdad, some members of the Coordination Framework have raised reservations about Maliki’s potential return to power, citing a range of concerns.

“Should the Framework proceed with Maliki’s nomination, the Trump administration is likely to view the Iraqi government as having chosen Iran,” explained Victoria J. Taylor, who oversaw Iraq policy at the US State Department during the Biden administration and now serves as the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East program.

“The US response reflects a clear reluctance to see figures it associates with Iran’s influence, including Nouri al-Maliki, return to the premiership,” Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, told The New Arab.

Recent public comments, including from Donald Trump, underline that Washington is prepared to signal discomfort with such an outcome, particularly given sensitivities around sanctions, finance, and security cooperation, the analyst said.

“From the Iraqi perspective, however, this kind of messaging is often viewed as undue involvement in domestic political choices, reinforcing concerns about external pressure on government formation,” Shakeri said.

“The result is a careful but growing tension between US preferences and Iraqi assertions of political autonomy, which adds another layer of complexity to an already delicate process.”

Amid ongoing sanctions and mounting pressure from Washington due to the influence of pro-Iranian factions in power and Baghdad’s close ties with Tehran, a pivotal question arises: what price is Iraq willing to pay for defying the Trump administration by reappointing Maliki for a third term?

Equally uncertain is whether Trump will follow through on his threats to withdraw US support from Iraq if Maliki returns to office. Some voices within Trump’s inner circle may argue that Maliki, a familiar and once-supported figure, offers a degree of stability.

In this view, despite the broader risks his return poses for US interests, the most pragmatic course for safeguarding American priorities in Iraq and the region may be to find a way to work with him in his anticipated third term.

Post-Assad Syria and US-Iran brinkmanship

Maliki’s potential return to the prime ministership poses a significant risk to Iraq’s relationship with Syria. During his previous tenure, Maliki played a pivotal role in aligning Baghdad with President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

He endorsed the narrative that Assad’s violent crackdown on opposition forces, beginning in 2011-2012, was a legitimate counter-terrorism campaign, lending Iraq’s support to the Syrian government’s actions. Maliki has expressed a deep mistrust of Ahmed Al-Sharaa, viewing him as a terrorist with roots in al-Qaeda who improbably ascended to the Syrian presidency.

Warning of a “quite dangerous situation,” Marco Carnelos, the former Italian ambassador to Iraq, said in a TNA interview that a former top regional leader recently relayed concerns that Maliki’s return to power could risk an “open Syria-Iraq confrontation” with much potential to “escalate dramatically”.

As the former Italian diplomat observed, the future of Baghdad-Damascus relations hinges largely on whether Syria can remain a unified state or chaotically fragment.

Should Syria experience state collapse and chaotic fragmentation, as Israel hopes for, the resulting turmoil could easily draw Iraq into a broader regional conflagration, with potentially devastating consequences for many other parts of the Middle East.

Maliki’s previous dependence on sectarian- and security-focused narratives would likely attract heightened scrutiny across the region. “Even if framed in state or sovereignty terms, such language risks reinforcing perceptions that Baghdad is leaning toward a narrower political axis rather than acting as a balanced regional actor,” Shakeri told TNA.

“In the Syrian context, where governance, communal dynamics, and border arrangements remain sensitive, this could complicate Iraq’s efforts to engage pragmatically with Damascus while maintaining confidence among other political actors inside Iraq,” he added.

“Maliki's return would be likely to bring fraught relations with regional countries, just as existed during his first two terms as prime minister,” noted Taylor, who explained that Maliki would probably change how Baghdad engages Damascus.

“Even as most of the Shia political leadership views Damascus with some suspicion, Prime Minister Sudani's government has continued to engage Damascus more pragmatically on issues such as security. Maliki's recent statements asserting that Syria is led by terrorists and that he would not meet with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa provide a clear warning of his contentious approach to Syria,” she told TNA.

Carnelos also raised important questions about the potential consequences of a US-Iran war in the coming period, particularly with regard to Maliki's likely return to power in Iraq. Much will ultimately “depend a lot on what the US will do against Iran in the following days; in other words, will Iraqi pro-Iran Shia militias become more active against US military assets in the country after a US military strike against Tehran with Maliki back in power in Baghdad?”

Maliki's anticipated return to power will, in large part, be influenced by the Trump administration’s stance on Tehran and the broader regional preparations for the potential fallout from US strikes on Iran.

As Washington presses forward with its “maximum pressure” campaign - an approach met by the Islamic Republic with “maximum resistance” - the risks of escalating brinkmanship become increasingly pronounced. This trajectory holds the potential for significant spillover, not only into Iraq but also across Iran’s other neighbouring states.

Iraq's future and sovereignty

Looking ahead, it is impossible to overlook the fact that Maliki’s anticipated return to the prime ministership could exacerbate existing tensions within Iraq’s domestic political landscape, while also increasing geopolitical and security risks related to regional flashpoints.

Maliki’s legacy as prime minister has become inextricably linked to the sectarian tensions and widespread instability that marked his tenure, as well as to his close alignment with the Islamic Republic.

However, for many Iraqis, his potential reappointment is also viewed as a means of asserting national sovereignty, not merely as an indicator of Iran’s enduring influence in Baghdad.

Regardless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Maliki’s third term would introduce new complexities to Iraq’s delicate balancing act between Washington and Tehran.

Maliki’s longstanding ties with Iran and Assad-era Syria raise concerns that his return to power could embroil Iraq in regional crises, which Baghdad has, to its credit, thus far managed to avoid since 7 October. Whether Iraq can sustain its relative domestic stability while deftly navigating the turmoil that surrounds it, with Maliki at the helm, remains an open and pressing question.

Ultimately, Iraq faces the imperative of avoiding the missteps of its past, which have plunged the country into years of instability. Maliki’s likely return to power underscores both the persistent political complexities within Iraq and the broader power struggles that continue to shape the Middle East.

Indeed, a third term for Maliki as prime minister will serve as a critical test for Iraq’s sovereignty and its future trajectory. The stakes for the country are, to say the least, very high.

“I hope that [Maliki having a third term] is not going to symbolise a return to the past tension that characterised the post-2003 war in Iraq, and that [Maliki], aware of, and more experienced by, the difficult previous period in power, will make his best to bring Iraq definitively out of the last decades’ turmoil,” Carnelos told TNA.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle