The Healthy Uncertainty of Iraqi Elections

If Incumbency Is Synonymous with Life Tenure in Most Arab States, It Is Not in Iraq, Where Iraqis Punish a Person Deemed Ineffective and Corrupt

11.11.2025

By Micheal Rubin*

Source:https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/the-healthy-uncertainty-of-iraqi-elections

Iraqis head to the polls today to choose a new government, the country’s sixth parliamentary election in two decades. Iraqis await the outcome, many with cynicism and some with enthusiasm born either of ideology or the hope that their wasta—clout and connections—can win them a prestigious or profitable seat in Iraq’s civil service if they attach themselves to the right politician.

The one thing Iraqis agree on is that they do not know who will emerge from elections. Determining how many seats each party wins is only the first step. Iraqi party bosses—some elected, most operating in the background—will then jockey to form coalitions, all the while creating a holistic government in which all major sects and identity groups feel represented. By tradition, though not law, Kurds take the presidency, Sunni Arabs the parliament speakership, and Shi’i Arabs take the premiership.

While Americans still view Iraq through the lens of President George W. Bush’s controversial decision to invade the country, Iraq today is a different country. Perhaps three-quarters of the country’s inhabitants were born after, or have no real memory of, Saddam Hussein; even memory of the U.S.-led occupation fades. Sunnis in Ramadi and Fallujah ask when American marines might come back as tourists; the violence and hatred that accompanied the insurgency is as distant to Al-Anbar today as the Vietnam War was to Vietnamese when President Bill Clinton re-established relations.

Iraqi political culture has changed. Campaigning began for today’s elections months ago. A generation ago, Iraqis feared talking about politics or criticizing Saddam’s government. That fear continues, ironically, in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani and sons Masrour and Waysi have imposed a Baathist style of leadership that can end in ruin, if not imprisonment and death, for those prone to criticism. But in the rest of Iraq, criticism is rife and vibrant.

If incumbency is synonymous with life tenure in most Arab states, it is not in Iraq, where Iraqis punish a person deemed ineffective and corrupt. The Iraqi incumbency rate is less than 40 percent, and after many elections closer to 25 percent. In contrast, the congressional incumbency rate is closer to 80 percent and often more. In November 2019, young Iraqis grew so upset with Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi that they took to the streets, ultimately forcing his early departure.

While militias—both Shi’ite and Kurdish—seek to distort electoral will, there are limits to their influence simply because none has a monopoly over power. Personal differences and divisions are rife even among pro-Iranian groups, especially since the money at stake is so high. Contrary to the belief of many American observers, money flows not from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Iraqi militias but, rather, in the reverse direction. Iraq is where the Revolutionary Guard seeks to make money. With high rises, foreign hotel chains, and highways, and bridges springing up across the country, resentment against those with an inside track is reaching a fever pitch. When squabbles over turf or positions erupt into violence and innocents get murdered as collateral damage—think mob shootouts in 1930s Chicago—that anger becomes white hot.

The question for Iraqis is whether the system can accommodate their anger. The United Nations and former Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer designed elections in Iraq to be fundamentally different from those held in the United States. Multiple candidates run, assigned to party lists by unelected party bosses. This creates a system in which aspiring politicians must win the loyalty of party machines, often by exaggerating sectarianism or ethnic interests. While Iraq has adjusted its election districts over time—gone are the nationwide ballots once embraced for ease of election management—the fact remains that Iraqi politicians seek to appease party leaders more than they do constituents. Corrupt power brokers who are not accountable at the ballot box determine the shape of the government more than voters.

While it is trite to say every election is a watershed, frustration with the system and the old guard may come to a head in the weeks and months to come. Incumbent Prime Minister Muhammed Shia’ al-Sudani is weak. While there has been vast improvement to the lives of ordinary Iraqis under his tenure—he has presided over the sort of infrastructure development Americans only promised—a phone tapping scandal early in his tenure hobbled him. He retained office not because he beat the charges, but because both rivals and outside powers like the Islamic Republic of Iran preferred a weak prime minister to a strong figure less prone to manipulation.

Such a desire for weakness does not transcend elections. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’i Arab power broker and one of Iraq’s most corrupt former leaders, is determined to stage a comeback while he still can: He is 75 years old and has had a series of health problems. Isolated from the general public by checkpoints and bodyguards, he does not fully recognize how different Iraq has become in the twenty years since he first came to power.

Indeed, while Maliki aspires to return to the Republican Palace, his desire for a last hurrah signals the end of a generation of post-war leaders. Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Maliki, Haider al-Abadi, and Abdul-Mahdi are all in their 70s or 80s and in ill-health. So are other powerbrokers like Badr Corp chief Hadi al-Amiri and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani. Rival Kurdish leader Bafil Talabani, meanwhile, faces public questions about his mental stability; bipolarity and depression run on his mother’s side.

This leaves few others in the wings who may survive the purge of time. Qais al-Khazali is just 51 years old and desperately seeks to pivot to acceptability, if not respectability, the way 52-year-old Muqtada al-Sadr has done. As the Talabanis implode, Barzani seeks to empower his 56-year-old son Masrour and his 24-year-old grandson Areen.

Each, however, is weighed down by baggage. The United States once branded Khazali a terrorist. He seeks to come in from the cold, but he and his brother cannot as easily cleanse themselves of the label of corrupt businessmen. Al-Sadr seeks to cloak himself in the anti-corruption mantle, but that is hard when he allies with Barzani, perhaps Iraq’s most corrupt leader.

Such dynamics and the disappointment in them reinforce the broader issue: For all those who condemn Iraqi democracy, such discussions and assessments would lead to a hefty prison term in any other Arab country; in Iraq they occur openly every day and in every tea house, burger joint, or Kurdish social club. At the same time, they open the door for a dark horse, a provincial governor from outside Baghdad, for example. Such uncertainty can be healthy.

When Arabs talk about representation and legitimacy and outside diplomats talk about inclusive government, they are speaking about Iraq. Perhaps it is time Americans stop self-flagellating over a war that occurred more than two decades ago and recognize that the new Iraq, for better or worse, has become a model for democracy in the region.

*Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Turkey. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.