How Gulf support could shape post-Assad Syria

Analysis: The leadership in Damascus sees the oil- and gas-rich Gulf states as vital to Syria's future.

22.04.2025

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-gulf-support-could-shape-post-assad-syria

Syria’s government has spent the past few months putting much diplomatic energy into strengthening its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members.

The leadership in Damascus sees the oil- and gas-rich Gulf Arab states as extremely important to Syria’s future. The high-profile visits paid by President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar since early January are evidence of this.

Soon after Bashar Al-Assad’s ouster on 8 December 2024, Sharaa began speaking of Saudi Arabia playing a critical role in Syria’s future. When Assad Al-Shaibani visited Saudi Arabia at the beginning of this year on his first foreign trip since becoming his country’s chief diplomat, he said that Riyadh was ready to “participate in Syria's renaissance and support its unity and territorial integrity”.

It is noteworthy that Syria’s new government is sending a delegation to Washington for this week’s yearly International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Spring Meetings. According to reporting from Reuters, Saudi Arabia has paid off Syria’s World Bank debts to the tune of $15 million.

This will do much in terms of opening the door to funding in grants for the war-torn country’s reconstruction. Additionally, on the sidelines of these meetings, the Saudis and the World Bank will host a roundtable on Syria.

Saudi Arabia’s role in the 'new Syria'

Saudi Arabia’s leadership is determined to assist post-Assad Syria with its fragile transition in ways that go beyond diplomatic meetings, rhetoric, and symbolic gestures. With Syria badly needing massive amounts of economic assistance, this type of Saudi support can make a huge difference for the country during this delicate and challenging transition.

“Should Saudi Arabia pay off Syria’s debts to the World Bank, then the immediate practical implication would be that the World Bank could approve new funds to help finance the country’s reconstruction,” explained Dr Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, in an interview with The New Arab.

“No doubt, it would reflect very positively on Saudi-Syrian relations and the Kingdom’s leadership would view it as an opportunity to guide the new Syrian government and, at the same time, ensure that Iranian influence remains compromised.”

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, said that the Saudi commitment of $15 million to paying off Syria’s World Bank debts illustrates Riyadh’s quest to see the new Syrian government succeed. He told TNA that the move constituted a “practical step” which will lead to a strengthening of bilateral ties and “send a clear signal to the international community” that the Saudis will “extend a hand to Damascus now that a new page was opened”.

All Gulf states are stakeholders in Syria’s future. Leaders throughout the Gulf share a desire to see stability prevail in the country, with the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity central to their vision for a stable and secure Syria.

Officials in all GCC members share concerns about power vacuums emerging, given the potential for violent extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) to exploit such chaotic conditions.

All six GCC states strongly favour a lifting of American and European sanctions on Syria, which are strangling the country’s economy and keeping foreign investors away at a time when the war-ravaged and impoverished country desperately needs massive amounts of foreign direct investment.

Additionally, the Gulf Arab governments would like to see Syria’s new authorities successfully clamp down on Captagon production.

“GCC rulers have individually and collectively pledged to assist [Sharaa], both to restore legitimate authority in Damascus, as well as bring in and preserve Syria inside their stabilising cocoon,” explained Dr Kéchichian.

Damascus unsurprisingly sees the GCC states, along with Turkey, being the regional players of most importance to Syria’s reconstruction and redevelopment. The cards which Gulf Arab monarchies have are unique, giving GCC members opportunities to gain high levels of clout in post-Assad Syria against the backdrop of Iranian influence in the country drastically declining with the former regime’s fall.

Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (who does not speak on behalf of either institution), told TNA that the Gulf Arab monarchies have three things which Syria currently needs: “Money, oil, and good relations with the United States.”

Despite the Gulf states sharing many interests in post-Assad Syria, the GCC members will be of varying levels of importance to the country’s future, and their roles will differ.

Saudi Arabia, the first foreign state for both Sharaa and Shaibani to visit following the regime’s fall four-and-a-half months ago, is taking the lead within the GCC when it comes to engagement with the new Syrian government.

“Saudi Arabia - well, it’s Saudi Arabia. No other Arab government has that same level of political and economic clout, in addition to its symbolic and religious role,” said Lund.

Nonetheless, Qatar and the UAE are also set to play key roles in Syria’s future.

Qatar and the UAE

Of the six GCC states, Qatar is the one which Syria’s current leadership considers most dependable and credible. On 15 April, Sharaa was in Qatar for his first visit since becoming president. While in Doha, he met with Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani and the Syrian delegation, which included Shaibani, and took to X to hail Qatar as the “country that has stood by Syrians from day one and has never abandoned them”.

Six days later, a Qatari security delegation came to Damascus for talks with Syrian officials about bolstering security and police coordination at the bilateral level. Notably, Emir Tamim visited Damascus in January as the first Arab leader to do so following Assad’s ouster. Since that visit, the Qataris have taken steps to assist Syria with its energy crisis.

Doha has been a strong advocate for the lifting of the West’s economic sanctions on post-Assad Syria. Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed al-Khulaifi, made it clear that he will address this issue with US officials at this week’s IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington. Doha has signalled its desire to help Syria pay the salaries of its public sector employees, yet with the US still imposing the Caesar Act, Qatar has had to hold back to avoid breaching these secondary sanctions.

“Qatar was always a strong supporter of the Syrian uprising and seems to have cultivated under-the-table relations with Sharaa’s group before it seized power. It’s a trusted ally in ways the other Gulf states are not,” noted Lund.

“Qatar, which considers political Islam to be central to foreign policy, views strengthening Syrian-Turkish ties to be in its national interest,” explained Dr Quilliam.

By contrast, the UAE’s leadership has rigidly opposed political Islam, and Abu Dhabi was nervous about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s rise to power following the overthrow of a regime that the Emiratis had invested significant diplomatic capital into trying to rehabilitate and shore up since late 2018.

The UAE, noted Dr Quilliam, “wants to prevent political Islam from becoming a feature of Syria’s foreign policy and the country to align more closely with Abu Dhabi’s ‘secular’ approach to building international partnerships”.

Yet, Abu Dhabi has demonstrated its ability to make the most of the new reality in Syria and approach Sharaa’s government in ways which are pragmatic, underscored by Sharaa and Shaibani’s visits to the UAE.

Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that the UAE will be the GCC member most suspicious of the new Syrian leadership and most worried about the possibility of HTS rule in Damascus emboldening Islamist and jihadist groups and causes in other parts of the Arab-Islamic world.

Despite such concerns, the UAE will probably continue to engage the current Syrian government, hoping that Abu Dhabi will be able to influence Damascus through a cordial and cooperative relationship.

“Abu Dhabi was not inclined to trust Sharaa when he came to power, and that’s putting it mildly. But since then, both sides have made a real effort to get along,” Lund told TNA.

“For the new Syrian government, it’s important to keep the Emiratis sweet, to avoid a situation where they turn hostile or start lobbying aggressively for a harder line in Washington. Their connections with the Israelis could also come in handy, and of course investments and aid,” he added.

Gulf competition in Syria?

Since Assad’s fall, Syria has not become a battleground in any intra-GCC power struggle. Had the Assad regime collapsed during the time of the Emirati- and Saudi-led blockade of Qatar (2017-21), it probably would have been, but the Gulf’s current geopolitical landscape is different.

Nonetheless, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of rivalries and tensions between Gulf monarchies playing out in Syria as the country’s transition moves forward.

If rivalries between GCC states and Turkey, which did much to shape regional affairs in the 2010s, erupt today, that would be “very bad” news for Syria, according to Lund.

“There may come a point when the ballooning Turkish and Qatari influence in Syria becomes intolerable to the Emiratis, not to mention the Israelis. But I think Turks, Qataris, and Syrians get that,” he told TNA.

“They will try to reduce friction and avoid any unnecessary provocations. Ankara and Doha are probably fine with Sharaa maintaining a neutral posture in Arab and regional politics, since they know he’ll never slip over into the Emirati camp. For now, they just want his government to survive and consolidate itself,” explained Lund.

Throughout the short term, the GCC members are set to maintain unity in relation to Syria, according to Dr Kéchichian, who thinks so largely due to the Gulf Arab states’ shared desire to see Sharaa’s government succeed. He told TNA that it is unclear how intra-GCC tensions and competition between the Gulf Arab monarchies will play out vis-à-vis Syria further down the line.

“Though the Syrian president faces gargantuan challenges, his government adopted meaningful short-term reforms that will need to be validated over the mid- and long-term, especially after the country adopts a new constitution. Inasmuch as inter-Arab rivalries are inevitable because of competing interests, the UAE and Qatar may yet engage in such brinkmanship, though it is too soon to know the direction that such developments might take,” said the Riyadh-based scholar.

The chances of continued Gulf unity in Syria will depend in no small part on how the UAE perceives Qatar and Turkey’s influence in Damascus. Despite Abu Dhabi’s rapprochements with Doha and Ankara, it would be easy to see the UAE’s leadership becoming more concerned about the Qatari-Turkish alliance’s role in an Islamist-ruled Syria.

Dr Quilliam believes that the prospects for GCC unity in post-regime change Syria are “low” and that “Qatar and the UAE will likely come to compete for influence with Doha backing the government and, in time, the UAE lending support to opposition groups”.

He told TNA that Emirati-Turkish competition in parts of Africa stands a good chance of manifesting itself in Syria, which could bring Abu Dhabi and Doha into “direct competition”.

Yet, Dr Quilliam concluded that such a scenario could be prevented if Sharaa’s government or regional players, chiefly Saudi Arabia, take steps to manage such possible tensions if and when they arise down the road.

Looking ahead, the reignition of such divisions between Gulf Arab states and Turkey in Syria is not inevitable, even if there are valid reasons to be concerned about developments unfolding in that manner.

The signs are reassuring that the new Damascus leadership wants to avoid bringing Syria into the crosshairs of intra-GCC and Arab-Turkish rivalries in which the country is merely a square on a chessboard.

Moreover, if Abu Dhabi, Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh continue to maintain pragmatic approaches to the ‘New Syria,’ as opposed to ones driven by ideology, these states may prove capable of managing their Syria-related disagreements in diplomatic manners. If so, Syria could become a place for cooperation, not confrontation, between the Gulf and Turkey.

Such a scenario, whereby regional tensions are contained and pragmatism reigns, would be optimal for Damascus. At the end of the day, Sharaa’s government must work with Turkey and all the Arab countries which are willing to give Syria support in one way or another amid this difficult period.

With US President Donald J. Trump to visit Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in early May for his first foreign trip since returning to the White House, these three GCC members can all use this opportunity to send him a unified message in support of lifting sanctions on post-regime change Syria.

If the leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha can successfully persuade Trump to do so, that would showcase the ability of the Gulf Arab monarchies to work together in advancing their common interest in making Syria - and by extension other countries in the neighbourhood - more stable and opening the country up to GCC-based investors.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero