Tsarist Russia was the country where Kurdology was born as a new branch of science
, by the middle of the 19th centuries, at the end of the Crimea war , in 1854 , with
Saint-
The
8) Ocalan, Kemalism and Kurdistan :
Abdullah Ocalan proves to be rather mild and comprehensive as to the role of Mustafa Kemal . In chapter 6 , subtitle “The Kurds at the time of capitalism” , he writes : “The war of national liberation (of Turkey) led by Mustafa Kemal was a progressive war and responded to the common will of the two peoples, the Turks and the Kurds” . That is globally true, but this requires some explanation.
The peace treaty of Sèvres with Ottoman Turkey, signed on 10 August 1920, provides
for an autonomous Kurdistan within Turkey, and for an indpendent Kurdish state if
the Kurds demand independence within one year from the coming into force of the treaty
and that the Council of the League of Nations decides to grant them this independence
(Art. 62 to 64 : Kurdistan). The same treaty provides for an independent state of
Armenia , somewhere to the north of Ottoman Kurdistan, without saying where its border
line was to be . This state of Armenia was , one may say, a “ghost state” , or ,
as it had been put by le Comte , Earl , Lobanoff , minister of Foreign Affairs of
Russia, ‘An Armenia without Armenians’ . The Kurdish notables and religious chiefs
were however alarmed , already in 1918/1919 , by rumours saying that six Kurdish
provinces (vilayets) – Erzurum, Kars, Bitlis, Erzinjan, Mush , and Van – were to
be ceded to Armenia . Kars had been annexed by Russia at the Ottoman-
When Mustafa Kemal Pasha held the first congress of the movement wich was still
to become the Kemalist movement for the liberation of Turkey , that was at Erzurum
, in Kurdistan , from 23 July to 6 August 1919 . He presented himself as the “saviour”
of Kurdistan, the defender of the Eastern Vilayets , and the champion of Islam and
the caliphate . Most of the delegates were Kurds . Mustafa Kemal used to kiss the
hands of Kurdish religious chiefs present at the congress, to show how a good Muslim
he was . He was elected president of the movement at Erzurum , because the Kurdish
chiefs preferred to be the allies of the Turks to the risk of being placed under
an Armenian sovereignty . The first military victory of the Kemalist movement was
on the front of the Caucasus , and achieved by the Kurds . These were to participate
in the war of liberation on the Anatolian fronts as well . This is recognised by
the Turks.
The “ Amasya Protocol ” of the Kemalist movement , dated 22 October 1920
, which was a reaction against the Sèvres treaty, reads : “ In order to circumvent
the propaganda of lies by the foreigners under the disguise of the Kurdish people’s
independence, it has been decided that the Kurds should be supported in terms of
ethnic and social rights in a way and place where it allow their free development
”.
Again, on 10 February 1922, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT, parliament)
passed an “ Autonomous Kurdistan Act ” , in which one can read : “ As a requirement
of civilisation and considering the object to guarantee the progress of the Turkish
nation, GNAT starts to establish an administration pertinent to the customs of the
Kurdish people.”
The Kurds were betrayed by Europe at the conference of Lausanne ,
in 1923 , and cheated by the new Kemalist Republic of Turkey , which was internationally
consecrated by the treaty of Lausanne .
Article 11 of the Constitution of 1924 reads
: “ Every Turk over the age of 30 is eligible as deputy ” . Article 12 : “ Those
who are not literate in Turkish could not be elected as deputy ”. Article 88 : “
Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk ”.
These articles will be resumed in the 1961 and 1982 Constitution.
Article 3-
These constitutional devices mean there is no Kurdistan, no Kurdish people, and the
ban on the Kurdish language . The Kurds, the name of whose homeland , Kurdistan ,
became a taboo under the republic, are just “Turks”, whether they like it or not.
In chapter 6 , under subtitle “The Kurdish question in Turkey and the democratic
solution” , Abdullah Ocalan writes : “The national basis of the Republic of Turkey
as founded by Ataturk is not racist (….) When the Republic uses the slogan saying
How Happy is whoever can say I am a Turk ! the aim is only to keep the morals of
the Turks” . The fact is that such racist slogans are used only in Turkish Kurdistan
, never in central or western Turkey . They are written in huge letters painted in
white at the slopes of the Kurdish mountains , and are so gross that they are readable
at 15 or 20 k.m distance . Another of these slogans painted at the Kurdish mountains,
for the ‘pleasure’ of the Kurds , is this : “One Turk is worth the world” . This
is the seal of Turkish colonialism and military occupation at the forehead of the
Kurdish people.
Again in chapter 6 , subtitle “The Kurds at the time of capitalism”
, Abdullah Ocalan appreciates that the Kemalist Republic “adopted the positive European
values” and “endeavoured to keep Mosul and Kirkuk within the Turkish National Pact
, without renouncing its right on these areas” . In other terms , Mr. Ocalan congratulates
Mustafa Kemal not to have renounced “the right” of Turkey on Iraqi Kurdistan . Yet
he blames him not to have created a fully democratic Turkey , responding to the demands
of “the people” . Ocalan’s readers were gratified with the existence of two peoples
in Turkey , the Turks and the Kurds , the second of whom accepted , in 1919 , thanks
to the comedy played by Mustafa Kemal at Erzurum, to join their forces with those
of the Turks, for the liberation of Turkey from Western occupation . Now that republican
Turkey has obtained an international consecration by the treaty of Lausanne, in 1923
, Mr. Ocalan grants his reader with the existence of only one people in Turkey ,
the people , the Turkish people , or “the people of Turkey”. He repeats that “Turkey
is the mother homeland of the Kurds and the Turks.”
In his defence before the Turkish
State Security Court, at Imrali, in 1999 ( published by the PKK in English under
the title “Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question” , mentioned
above) , Abdullah Ocalan (p.23 : I am quoting him directly from the English text)
, speaking about the events of 1919 , mentions “the extensive claims by the Armenians
in the East” , then he adds : “It was obvious that national liberation had to be
based on the two fundamental peoples , the Kurds and the Turks. If the two nations
went their separate ways, and especially if they acted against each other, they would
have ended up by losing all they had” . Abdullah Ocalan had the courage to say ,
before the Turkish court, that the Kurds and the Turks were two distinct nations
, and that they needed union before the same dangers . All this is right . One can
still agree with him that , in this union, the Turks played the first role. Mustafa
Kemal Pasha was an Ottoman general and commanded regular Ottoman troops , while the
Kurdish chiefs had no political organisation and no regular troops , but each had
under his command a local force , his own people .
One cannot , however , agree with
Ocalan when he says (p. 25 of the English text of his Imrali defence) : “The triumph
of the national liberation movement and of the Republic must therefore be seen as
an historic common country and a state for the two peoples” . He confounds “state”
with “country” , but this is a current use , not to say a current mistake , in the
English language . Since the Kurds and the Turks are two distinct nations , they
can have a common state -
The homeland of the Kurds is Kurdistan
, not Turkey . The Kurds had Kurdish-
In pages 52-
One may have doubt , but let us suppose this was Mustafa Kemal’s answer
at that press conference . Why then to recourse , for the geographical definition
of Kurdistan , to what Mustafa Kemal was thinking of , since it was under his presidency
that the very nom of Kurdistan was very soon to be banned , or was already banned
? We have much older and more objective definitions of Kurdistan . Without going
in history back to Antiquity or the Middle Age , one can point to ancient known Turkish
writers such as Evliya Celebi , in his
Yavuz Sultan Selim I beat the Safavid shah Ismail of Persia , at the war of Chaldiran
, in 1514 , with the participation of Kurdish princes on his side , with their own
forces . One of them was the grand-
Joseph von
Hammer, the Austrian historian of the 19th century, whose work entitled
Sir Mark Sykes left us in his book
Many Kurds and Turks keep copies of official Ottoman
maps – by the General-
According to the first census of population
under Mustafa Kemal , in 1927, Turkey had a total population of 13'648'000 inhabitants
, unevenly distributed . Western Turkey was much more populated than the central
areas , and than Kurdistan , in the eastern areas . We don’t have figures or liable
estimates as to the number of Kurds at that time . If one has to make an estimate
, it can be said the Kurds could hardly represent 20 % , if not less , of the Republic’s
total population. But they were still concentrated in the eastern vilayets , beside
a few groups already established in central Turkey (area of Konya, the plains o Haymana,
to the south of Ankara , and some others) , where they had their own villages and
continued to speak Kurdish (as still today) . The Kurds at Istanbul were only a few
families , remnants of the former Kurdish aristocracy , some intellectuals and merchants
. It is from the 1950s on that the Kurds began growing in number at a rate of about
3,5 % per year, much higher than that of the Turks proper (about 2,1 or 2,2 %) ,
thanks to the Kurdish woman fertility, on one hand , and to a lesser rate of infantile
mortality , on the other hand . At the beginning of the 21st century , as said above,
the Kurds in Turkey should represent up to almost one third of the total population
, and this is resented by the Turkish establishment as a threat menacing the future
of the Republic . In the Turkish mass media there are sometimes debates about this
threat , on “how to limit the population growth in the Eastern provinces”. The more
the Kurds in Turkey are numerous the harsher is the policy of the Turkish establishment
against them . This reflects fear of the future . Why to have fears regarding the
numerical importance of the Kurds if their rights are duly recognised as a distinct
nationality within a multinational democracy ?
9) A federation of Mideastern states
?
In chapter 6 , after having spoken of the solution he suggests to the Kurdish question in Turkey, Iran, Iraq , and Syria ( reviewed above in this paper under subtitles 5 and 6) , Abdullah Ocalan discusses the point about the unity of all the Kurds. He writes with this respect : “In the past the slogan of an independent, unified and socialist Kurdistan was launched , but it represented the national understanding of the question . Furthermore , whatever attractive it might be , it was not realistic . It will be more realistic to launch a slogan seeking : Democracy and freedoms for each state under the roof of which the Kurds live, each of these states being the mother homeland of the Kurds” . Then he adds : “the right strategy is to struggle for democracy and equality within the unity of each of these states , since their democratisation will mean democracy in Middle East and open the way for a kind of union between the states of the Middle East similar to that of the European Union.”
I began this paper by saying that a kind of union between the states of the Middle
East within which the Kurds live , possibly with some others, could be envisaged
for a later future , not before a real solution to the Kurdish question within the
concerned states will have been found . We have seen Abdullah Ocalan more or less
admitting a federalist solution for the Kurds in Iran and Iraq , but refusing it
for the sole Kurds of Turkey . We know his real aim , and hope , is the accession
of Turkey to the membership of the European Union . Here is he speaking about a kind
of Mideastern union between the states of the area . He is just talking, and may
say anything and the contrary. How could Turkey , with 21 or 22 million Kurds not
recognised as a nationality within its borders, be at the same member of the European
Union and of a Mideastern Union ?
10) Undue hopes put in the European Union
During the years of fighting between the PKK guerrilla and the Turkish state (1984-
Over five years, as president of the Kurdistan National Congress , I have been writing
letters and sending memorandums to the European institutions and their member states
, demanding that prior to any negotiation with Turkey with a view to its admission
as member of the EU , Turkey should have reached a political solution to the Kurdish
national question, by dialogue with representatives of the Kurdish people, PKK included
. As already said , in these documents , it was affirmed that the Kurds are a non-
Unfortunately, at the European Helsinki summit of December
1999 , the name of Turkey was put on the list of states “candidate at membership”
of the EU , without any reference to the Kurdish question . The European Commission
, following the summit, adopted , in 2000 , the general criteria of Copenhagen ,
about democracy, respect for human rights and the rights of national minorities,
as the basis for democratisation of Turkey , without any reference to a specific
Kurdish question, on which the future of democracy depends . In the Turkish program
for compliance with these criteria , no reference either was made to the question
, not even to the existence of Kurds in Turkey . When the project “ Turkey 2000 Accession
Partnership ” , prepared by the European Commission , was submitted to the European
Parliament for discussion, the Parliament adopted on 15 November 2000 a document
entitled “ Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession ” containing 29 points, which constitute
addenda bringing precision to the project , or bridging its gaps. Several of these
addenda concern the Kurds, especially points Nos 11 to 14 , which mention specifically
I do
not make it a mystery , I was , and still am , as surprised as angry at the hypocrisy
of the European Union . I denounced the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi , and Syrian oppressive
policy toward the Kurds, on the invitation of Canadian parliamentarians, at the federal
Canadian Parliament, in Ottawa , on 6 June 2000 . What I think about the hypocrisy
of the executive bodies of the European Union , regarding the Kurdish question in
Turkey , I said it publicly in my speech at the meeting held at the House of Commons
(British Parliament) , Grand Committee Room, London , on Tuesday 23 January 2001
, in the presence of British MPs , Lords , intellectuals , artists, friends of the
Kurdish people , and before the Kurdish intelligentsia at the British capital . I
repeated the same criticism at the meeting held the next day at the National Assembly
of Wales, Cardiff, and , at another date, in a press conference held at the European
Parliament , in Brussels . I presented the same criticism toward the European Union,
in courteous terms, to Mr. Romano Prodi , president of the European Commission ,
in a letter in the name of KNK , dated 14 November 2002 . I requested in this letter
the European Union to work for a real , and political , solution to the national
question of the Kurdish people in Turkey , by peaceful means, in consultation with
representatives of the Kurdish people. I repeated these criticism again at the KNK’s
General Assembly of December 2002 , before our European guests and friends . Does
not this attitude mean the Kurds in Turkey were considered by the European Union
as a respectful people , worth of a political solution, as long as they were fighting
by arms for their rights , and today that they have stopped fighting , and are just
begging for peace and democracy, they are no longer seen respectable , but worth
nothing ? Their name is not even mentioned in the conditions put by the European
Union for a possible accession of Turkey .
But could wee indeed blame Europe for this
volt-
11) Undue hopes put in the
European Court of Human Rights
Mr. Ocalan repeats at many places in his Democratic
Civilisation a topic he calls “the superiority of the European civilisation on the
traditional values of the civilsation of the Middle East” . We know how the hopes
put in the European Union for a political solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey
are undue. Ocalan’s hopes are now placed in the European Court of Human Rights .
In chapter 8 of his book , entitled “Can the European Law System Find a Way to Resolve
the Kurdish Question ?” , he naively thinks that “to place the Kurdish question and
my own case within the framework of the law system of the European Union furthers
the possibility for a political solution to this important question , since Turkey
is a party to this system, has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights ,
and accepts the competence of the European Court of Human Rights”. After having expressed
his ‘highest respect’ for the Court , he adds : “The European Court of Human Rights
is competent in matter of Kurdish question (…) since my own case is considered with
the highest importance by the Court, given my leading position which is part of my
popular personality among the Kurds”.
In the subtitle “The Kurdish Question, the Turkish
Republic and the European Law” , same chapter 8 , Mr. Ocalan says the Europan Convention
on Human Rights guarantees the free practice of the right of self-
I
have on my desk the (French) text of the European Convention on Human Rights : nothing
in its articles concerns the right of peoples to self-
The European Court of Human Rights
has no competence for the resolution of a political and national question . Its competence
includes reparation of violations of human rights and individual freedoms . Besides
, Mr. Ocalan confuses his own case , his rights as a human being, and the rights
of the Kurdish people .
On 12 March 2003 , the European Court of Human Rights passed
what should be a partial decision in the case
12) To offend Kurdish history and other political parties
Nothing is spared by the offending pen of Abdullah Ocalan . The Kurdish feudal principalities
, torn between the Ottoman and Persian empires , are sharply rejected just because
they were feudal and had to keep their existence between the two enemy empires ,
which were feudal themselves . Kurdistan became a battlefield between the two empires
for about two centuries, and the country was ruined . The Kurdish national uprisings
along the 19th centuries and the beginning of the 20th century , against Ottoman
domination, looting and tyranny , are said rebellions by Mr. Ocalan ; all what is
kept with respect in the collective memory of the Kurdish people, and is illustrated
in the Kurdish folk songs , the uprisings by the Bedir-
I do not say there is no matter for criticism in the other political parties, there
is surely , maybe a lot to say, for instance about the relationship between KDP and
PUK , once at war and once co-
Why to call the policy of PUK and KDP
According
to Ocalan’s concept , his party should open a section in each part of Kurdistan,
be it under a different name . The first regional experience of PKK , by the late
1980s and early 1990s, when they created a section for PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan under
the name of PAK , was a failure . This so-
Mr. Ocalan is very sharply critical too of the manner in which his directives
to the executive staff of his own party are carried out , but this is an internal
problem . To a few dramatic exceptions , the executive staff accepted criticism and
followed the position and ideas of their leader.
Mr. Ocalan says his party should
be open to criticism , whether it is expressed inside or outside the party , because
exchange of opinion means intellectual enrichment ; yet if criticism represents a
threat menacing the existence of PKK , it requires a response in accordance with
the strategy of the party’s legitimate self-
We have seen above the name of PKK was changed in the spring
2002 into KADEK, who stated the change was meant to abandon Leninism and the hierarchical
structure of the party . That was done according to Ocalan’s directives . Then ,
in early November 2003 , together with some other persons , KADEK became KGK (People’s
Congress of Kurdistan) , in order “to realise the Democratic Civilisattion , according
to the ideas of Abdullah Ocalan , the leader of the Kurdish people.”
All these changes
were ordered by Abdullah Ocalan by the way of his lawyers, going and coming between
the prison at Imrali , the Qandil mountain, and sometimes Europe. These are Kurdish
or Turkish lawyers from Turkey . Mr. Ocalan mandated European lawyers for his case
pending at the European Court at Strasbourg.
To abandon the hierarchical structure
by Ocalan’s party, the recourse to ‘civil society’ groups , the so-
Mr. Ocalan does not content himself with giving general orientation.
He has a network of unconditional supporters in Turkey , thank to whom he meddles
in almost everything , even as to the choice of candidates at parliamentary or municipal
elections . Any person who would not seem unconditionally faithful and obedient ,
or would prove to have some independence , some personality , and able to take initiative
other than his , will be put aside , or removed, accused of deviation . Within the
party apparatus , such a person could be declared a traitor . He wants himself to
be and remain the sole and absolute master of the party and the Kurdish people.
14)
On Ocalan’s strategy of legitimate self-
In chapter 6 , speaking of PKK under
subtitle 4 , Mr. Ocalan presents the party as a “political organisation to propose
solutions to the current situation in Kurdistan , on the basis of scientific socialism
and the characteristics of the 20th century” . Then he explains that the PKK strategy
of legitimate self-
In the 9th chapter ,
consecrated to his autobiography , subtitle “The search of peace” , Abdullah Ocalan
resumes the topic . He says: “The PKK position of ‘no peace nor war’ , of ‘legitimate
self-
Abdullah Ocalan leaves no doubt about it , since
he continues : “ The state cannot escape from peace with the Kurds (…) . All what
the Kurds demand is recognition for their existence , cultural freedoms , and full
democracy . One cannot imagine more modest demands . The PKK strategy of legitimate
self-
I wish Abdullah Ocalan , and the guerrilla in their mountain fastnesses
, long life, safety , and freedom . I wish Ocalan success in the strategy of legitimate
self-
15) On PKK/KGK’s “national leader”,
cult of Ocalan, and other topics
When the largest part of this paper was already written , news made public by Ocalan’s
lawyers , in March 2004, said Abdullah Ocalan is not satisfied with KGK ( People’s
Congress of Kurdistan), and that he wants it to be replaced by a new PKK , reduced
essentially to seven or eight hundred young people, among his unconditional followers,
perhaps trained by older members . Osman Ocalan, Abdullah’s younger brother , is
apparently angry, what for I do not know, but he left with a small group the Qandil-
If KGK , heir to PKK , is doomed to disappear and become again PKK, then why to dwell
on its programme? This is because it does not make much difference whether the name
is PKK, KADEK, or KGK , it is always the ideas of one man, Abdullah Ocalan. On11
November 2003 , the creation of KGK was proclaimed , at the Qandil headquarters ,
in four documents , all written as usual in Turkish , the “official language” of
Ocalan’s party . They were translated by the party into English . I read the English
translation. One piece is a general presentation called “Declaration of People’s
Democratic Rights” , another is the “Final Declaration of the Founding Conference
of KGK” , a third is its Programme and the fourth is the Constitution . In these
pieces (beside the Constitution, which is an internal statute) the ideas of Abdullah
Ocalan (including about the ‘neolithic society’) are repeated , and again repeated
, as by parrots . The creation of KGK had been demanded by Abdullah Ocalan to make
his party follow more clearly his ideas about the “Democratic Civilisation” and a
“scientific democracy” . The KGK was founded to respond to Ocalan’s demand and espouse
his ideas to work for ‘democratic Civilisation’ . All the points of criticism mentioned
above in this paper, regarding this work, are therefore applicable to KGK. There
is no need to dwell long on the matter , but two or three points could be added ,
or emphasis can be put on them :
a)-
To have a “President for life” , an eternal “National Leader”
, an immortal “Father of the people” , whoever might be -
The British did not make of Churchill , nor the
French of de Gaulle , their “Father” . Churchill , who had practically won the war
, lost the legislative elections before its end . De Gaulle , who incarnated the
French honour at that war , had to quit power one year after its end . We do not
find , in their respective country, their photography or their statute in the squares
of cities and at every corner of street . That is democracy.
In the case of PKK ,
the concept and function of a “leader of the people” are inherited from the Leninist
, if not Stalinist tradition . It is a culture . Abdullah Ocalan had the personality
and the character to make the throne his . All the forms of cult of the personality
, as they were in use in what was hitherto called the “Popular Democracies” , in
Central and Eastern Europe , till the fall of the Wall of Berlin , were professionally
practised by the PKK for the cult of Abdullah Ocalan . There is however a difference
: the cult of Abdullah Ocalan was still ongoing ten years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall . That is how late are the Kurds on the way of history.
Abdullah Ocalan was obviously
assisted , within PKK , by a teem of professionals in matter of his personal worship
. Many Kurds remember or possess those Party-
b.1 : “To be in favour of accession of Turkey to the European
Union . To strive for using this connection in favour of people and a Middle Eastern
Union.” (Title IV, Art. 12) .
To work for Turkish accession to the European union
is made a condition for membership , but still without any prior federalist or autonomy
solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey , exactly as Mr. Ocalan has formulated
it . The accession of Turkey to the European Union means Northern Kurdistan included
, and this means the division of the Kurdish nation into two halves , one becoming
“European” within Turkey, and the other remaining Mideastern . This is the negation
of the right of the Kurdish people to self-
b.2
: In the Programme (under B.g) another aim is the following :
“Civil society administration
will come to the fore . Political institutions will play a bridging role between
state and society. The nation-
We have seen, above , where Mr. Ocalan speaks about a solution to the Kurdish question in Syria, that he compares himself with the Biblical prophet Abraham , since both started their mission from Urfa (former Edessa, Ruha in Kurdish) , a province and a city in Turkish Kurdistan , to the north of the Syrian border. In our general presentation of his work, we noticed that Mr. Ocalan does not compare himself only with Abraham , but also Jesus Christ , and Muhammad . The book is full with such comparisons . Abdullah Ocalan is too clever to say crudely “I am a prophet” , but the aim is to let the common and pious Kurds believe it , for political use , thanks to a subtle art of wording . No need to say that the age of prophets is over. Mr. Ocalan is certainly among the first Kurds to know it .
This use of prophet’s image and religious feeling by a political leader , to let
others believe he is invested with a somehow divine mission for the salvation of
the people , and for the good of all humanity, is the summit of the art of self worship
and cult of the personality .
Yet Abdullah Ocalan was perhaps overhung by his professional
worshipers. He says himself not to be a hero . For a time he is modest and human
, it is worth underlying . His aim is actually double , one and the contrary at the
same time . On one hand it is a new utopia , a “scientific democracy”, a peaceful
world without states , regulated by the civil society : we are back with Marx and
Engels . On the other hand, it is exceedingly small , next to zero , regarding the
Kurds of Turkey . This is not the programme of a political party. It is not in accordance
with the legitimate aspirations of the Kurdish people, nor with the example of modern
multinational democracies.
17) The modern type of states : Multinational Democracies
Speaking of Turkey joining perhaps the European Union, without requiring any prior
and real solution to the Kurdish question , beside individual freedoms and civil
society initiatives , which do not constitute a solution to a national question ,
Abdullah Ocalan keeps himself prisoner of the type of nation-
We have seen above , under point 7 , other types of state , a review of the language
and nationality issues in Spain, Switzerland , Belgium , as well as Russia . We also
had a glimpse of the status of Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom.
A collective
work entitled Multinational Democracies , edited by Alain-
Charles
Taylor, in the foreword, writes :
“ If a minority , for instance, comes to see the
majority as concerned exclusively for its good , rather than that of the whole ,
they will begin to feel that they are no longer included in this ‘people’ . Then
, according to the very logic of democracy , they are no longer bound by the decisions
arrived at without any concern for them.”
“ ….. Any systematic inequality or mode
of discrimination in a modern society is seen as a challenge to its right to exist
. Now equality is not homogeneity , although it has been construed as such…. ”
“ We
are moreover in an age of identity awakening . Peoples are demanding that differences
, not hitherto acknowledged , be recognized , along with a host of diemensions –
gender , religious , linguistic , and cultural…. ”
“ This book attempts to tackle
these dilemmas in a very important category of cases, that of multinational democracies
. This is important, not only because national differences are among the most powerful
and intractable ; but also because the category of what can legitimately be called
‘multinational’ states is growing, as previously submerged groups begin to make identity
demands.”
James Tully writes in his introduction :
“ A ‘nation’ is a ‘people’ with
the right of self-
Why should not be allowed for the Kurds to claim a solution as found in
the modern type of
18) About self-
Abdullah Ocalan says to be against the right of self-
As this was said , the Kurds – today about 42 millions , with their diasporas -
To achieve such facultative unions does not put an end to the right of
self-
The right of self-
Furthermore, the
international law , in its present scope , and the modern doctrine , have made of
the right of self-
Antonio Cassese is a known academic in matter of international law . He defines himself
as a ‘positivist’ author , that is partisan of
An international
legal standard ? Possibly , but with a double-
In his introduction Antonio Cassese says
: “ self-
Noticing the large number of peoples demanding
self-
“ To explore self-
In a column of
Helmut Schmidt , the former social-
Valerie Giscard d’Estaing
, former president of the French Republic and current president of the European Convention
, which laid down the draft Constitution of the European Union , stated repeatedly
in 2003 and current 2004 that “Turkey is not European”. He said “only 5 % of the
territory of Turkey is at the edge of Europe, all the rest belongs to Asia.” The
political party representing the majority at the French parliament , which supports
the government designated by the President of the Republic Jacques Chirac, issued
in March 2004 a public statement proclaiming its opposition to the accession of Turkey
to the European Union .
The possibility of using the right of self-
Brother
The
There is something pathetic about
the situation of the Kurds , the position of Apo and the Apoci in today’s Turkey.
Here is a chief who had the courage and the will to create a party and organise a
guerrilla for the liberation of the Kurds . After his kidnapping , thanks to an international
conspiracy, and having become prisoner of Turkey, he reduced his demands about Kurdish
liberation to “next to zero” , denied in fact the existence of a Kurdish homeland
, saying “Turkey is the common mother-
We have seen above (under point 18 ) Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of Germany, saying it was a big mistake that the Versailles Treaty of 1919 did not decide the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Ottoman Kurdistan , and that the decision by the European summit , in December 1999, to admit Turkey as a candidate state at membership , without a prior solution to the Kurdish question, was another gross mistake . We have also heard Valerie Giscard d’Estaing , former President of the French Republic, and present president of the European Convention, saying “Turkey is not European” , but belongs to Asia for 95 % of its territory.
The Kurds in Turkey demand actually much less than the independence that Helmut Schmidt
blames Europe not to have imposed on Turkey by the Versailles Treaty . They do not
demand independence, but they cannot demand less than what is represented by the
structure and principles of Multinational Democracies . The government of the Province
of Quebec twice had recourse to a referendum for independence by self-
Not to be European
for Turkey is not merely a matter of geography , but also of culture. Only a thin
layer of the Turkish society , the ruling establishment , decided by the will of
Mustafa Kemal that it should look European. That was a façade behind which the two
main peoples of Turkey, the Turks and the Kurds, kept to be Eastern and Muslim.
In
Western Europe , the large Kurdish and Turkish communities live side by side in full
rupture; they ignore each other , but both continue to be Muslim and share the same
oriental culture . To the exception of the generation born in Europe , they live
at the heart of Europe in Muslim and oriental ghettos without being integrated .
After some thirty or fourty years of existence , most of them ignore any European
language . They read only Turkish or Kurdish papers , they eat , marry, live in family,
according to the tradition and the code of honour of the Muslim Near East . Valerie
Giscard d’Estaing is right , he said publicly what almost all Christian Europeans
think about . If the Turkish ruling establishment insists so much, since 1963 , to
accede to the European Union , it is a matter of money , to let a few more millions
of Turks and Kurds fill up the space of Shengen , as workers.
As said above in this
paper , an accession of Turkey to the European Union will extend artificially the
border of Europe, across Turkish Kurdistan , to the borders of Armenia, Iran, Iraq,
and Syria , and this means the artificial division of the same Kurdish nation into
two halves , one becoming “European” with Turkey – without any prior solution to
the Kurdish question –, and the other remaining Mid-
One could imagine
other solutions, a kind of association, a partnership between Europe and Turkey -
20) The Kurds , a flock of sheep or an adult people ?
Without going back
to ancient times, the Kurds over centuries have been living, in their homeland ,
according to the unwritten rules of a very hierarchical society, from the summit
down to the base. Once the summit was represented by a ‘Mîr’ , a feudal and hereditary
prince and his administration, then by the chief of a tribe or confederation of tribes,
then by a religious dignitary , shaikh of a ‘tariqa’ , and today by a political party,
or parties . The Kurds were illiterate people in their overwhelming majority.
Meanwhile
the Kurdish society has changed . We have several cities with a population between
half a million and one million, well educated men and women in their thousands ,
an important intelligentsia , a large and fairly well politicised working class .
Yet something of what one should call ‘the hierarchical mentality’ has subsisted
in the Kurdish society . When each year , in the cities of Turkish Kurdistan , millions
of civilians Kurds celebrate peacefully Newroz , in their Kurdish national colours
-
Nevertheless
, the deadlock is always there . Abdullah Ocalan , with his
The deadlock continues
to be there also because the Kurdish masses have acquired, across centuries, that
‘hierarchical mentality’ . They are the people , but have never been accustomed to
take decision and initiatives , to decide themselves of their future , to chose the
way they should follow for a better future .
The Kurds are not a flock of sheep ,
but a ‘teenager’ , not yet a fully adult people . Every Kurd , the smallest group
of Kurds, should feel responsible for the future of their people . They have the
right to take initiatives , to do it in full liberty , without awaiting orders from
anybody ; they should co-
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , 4th paragraph , reads : “Whereas it is essential , if man is not to be compelled to have recourse , as a last resort , to rebellion against tyranny and oppression , that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”
This means a contrario that if human rights are not protected by the rule of law
, man would have recourse to rebellion against oppression and tyranny . The human
rights of the Kurdish people , including the right of self-
Albert
de La Pradelle , French professor in international law , in a book entitled
On the moral and
even juridical ground , to preserve the life of the Kurdish nation , as for any other
nation, war is therefore not only licit, it is moral. To fight for the dignity and
liberty, for the existence and normal progress of this nation cannot be classed as
terrorism . Those who would pretend the contrary are the oppressors , and their partners
. It is the right of the Kurds to defend their existence, their dignity of human
beings, the honour and the heritage of their nation .
The normal objective for a colony , whether it is an “official” colony and recognised
as such, or an unofficial colony, a nameless one of the worst species , like Turkish
Kurdistan , is decolonization , to practise the right of self-
The strategy of legitimate self-
I
should say this defensive strategy is a useless strategy ; it cannot lead to any
solution to the Kurdish question . For how long the guerrilla , seen as terrorist,
should keep hidden in the mountains, in a state of “no peace nor war” ? And what
for ? To be used as an instrument in the hands of the Leader ? For a “next to zero”
solution ? To return back to the situation prevailing before 15 August 1984 ? Abdullah
Ocalan has not the right to use the guerrilla as an instrument in his hands . One
day he begs the pardon of the Turks, and the next day he threats Turkey with the
guerrilla . The guerrilla are our sisters and brothers, our children, and not a toy
to play with .
I am going to sum up what I wrote nearly twenty years ago about the
Kurdish political and military strategy. The Kurds have been accustomed across ages
to a defensive , guerrilla warfare in their mountains, and have acquired , as a consequence,
“the mentality of besieged people in their fortress”. This “war strategy of grandfathers”
, as I called it , was perhaps salutary in the past , but militarily speaking , it
cannot result in success face to modern state armies more numerous and equipped with
a sophisticated weaponry . The guerrilla , for instance , can never seize , keep
, feed and defend a large Kurdish city, of several hundred thousand inhabitants .
The remedy to this situation is to renounce the guerrilla defensive warfare in the
mountains, and to adopt an offensive strategy beyond Kurdistan, by small units, against
state military , economic , or symbolic targets , to punish the killers and the oppressors
, to let them fear you , but never , never to target innocent civilians. Somebody
said, the best defence is to be offensive.
That was in substance what I wrote in a
long article entitled “On the political and military strategy of the Kurdish national
liberation movement…”, published in the Arabic edition of Studia Kurdica , revue
of Institut Kurde de Paris ( January 1985 : 7-
Because
the Kurds are far more oppressed than any “official colony” in Africa or elsewhere
has ever been, they need far more determination , an unshakeable will , and much
imagination as to the means , to make themselves in a position to practise their
right of self-
The neolithic society has of course nothing to do with the Kurdish question , yet this does not seem exactly to be the opinion of Abdullah Ocalan , since reference to this society is found everywhere in his book . This should perhaps allow him to be seen as an unbelievably great scientist in the eyes of simple Kurds. We do owe to the neolithic society the beginning of the agricultural technology , with the domestication of some animals and plants , the use of appropriate stone tools , the building of primitive houses and the first villages, about twelve thousand years ago . We know it thanks to archaeology , the skill of specialists in prehistory, and the discovery of material relics by excavation (human and animal bones, cereals, stone tools, discovered at a same site) . Mr. Ocalan identifies this society with the ancient Kurds , while such relics were excavated not only at the foothills of Kurdistan , but at the foothills of other areas in the Near East, at the Syrian coast , Lebanon , Palestine and the valley of the Jordan river (see : Michael Roaf , Cultural Atlas of Mesopotamia and the Ancient Near East , Equinox, Oxford, 1990 ; R. J. Braidwood and B. Howe , Prehistoric Investigation in Iraqi Kurdistan , Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960).
Beside material relics, that could be touched with hand , measured , shot with a
camera , we know nothing else , nothing immaterial of the neolithic culture , in
matter such as language , social organisation, family , belief, relation between
a village and another .
The evolution was relatively slow . Sparse families lived
first in mountain caves , then began some cultivation at the foothills , while continuing
at the same time , for several thousands of years , the more primitive mood of living
, with hunting, fishing, gathering roots an wild fruits for subsistence. Michael
Roaf writes : “The introduction of farming brought about other important changes.
Houses became a permanent feature of village life , while settlers explored new materials
and new technologies , such as metal-
This city civilisation , with ruling
classes , kings , clerics , established religion , and slaves for digging irrigation
canals , started in southern Iraq , with the city-
The trouble with brother Abdullah Ocalan , he
makes Kurds all those who invented the agricultural technology twelve thousand years
ago and ascribes them social and intellectuals characteristics , immaterial virtues
of which the science of prehistory knows nothing . He does it , one may say , poetically
: his “Kurdish neolithic society” is much embellished , made a paradise of peace
, an ideal of justice , liberty , harmony, and equality , thanks, says he , to the
prominent role of woman , the ‘mother goddess” .
Abdullah Ocalan does not say clearly
– happily enough -
Some Western authors speak vaguely of figurines
(about 10 to 20 cm in length) representing a gross nude woman , perhaps pregnant
, discovered at some sites in the Near East. They call it “mother-
I do not suppose Abdullah Ocalan had read Ghirshman
, but he attributes the mother-
24) Conclusion ?
I
do not know if I succeeded to be fair in the criticism above of Mr. Abdullah Ocalan’s
ideas . I highly appreciate what he did before his arrest ; this will remain as part
of Kurdish contemporary history. But I do not agree with all what he said and did
once he was made prisoner of the Turkish state. I have the liberty, it is my duty
, and I feel it as my responsibility toward the Kurdish people, to say in what I
diverge in opinion with Mr. Abdullah Ocalan . The most important point of divergence
is about what I called his “next to zero” policy for Turkish Kurdistan . Other important
points of divergence are his aggressive attitude towards the other Kurdish political
parties , and his propensity to impose his hegemony on the political life of the
Kurdish society.
The “next to zero” policy , as a “solution” to the Kurdish question
in Turkey, is unacceptable. The Kurdish people in Turkey have the right to govern
themselves by themselves in Northern Kurdistan , according to their right of self-
Contrary to what Abdullah Ocalan thinks,
there is nothing in the legal order of the European Union that may compel a member
state, or candidate at membership , to resolve its national questions , to become
for instance a multinational democracy .
According to its present structure, the European
Union is a confederation of ‘national states’, in which decisions are taken unanimously
by the member states. Candidate states at membership are required to comply with
the criteria of Copenhagen , which are inadequate by themselves to resolve national
questions.
Spain became member of the Union with its already established constitutional
system of autonomy for regions and nationalities (see above under 7) , while the
United Kingdom granted Scotland and Wales self-
Turkey tries to convince the
European Union that it is advancing on the way of democracy and is steadily complying
with the criteria of Copenhagen . It may perhaps get access to the Union , without
having resolved the Kurdish question (see subtitle 10 above) . Individual Kurds can
bring a dispute opposing them to Turkey before the European Court of Human Right
and may obtain by a judgement the allocation of an amount of money by way of reparation,
but this is not of course a solution to the Kurdish question (subtitle 11 above)
. In other terms , if the Kurds in Turkey want a solution to their national question
, it is up to them to struggle in order to obtain it from Turkey, and not to look
for it in Europe.
The European institutions are powerless to make Turkey renounce
its policy of national denial and violation of humnan rights of the Kurdish people
. The Kurdish former MP Leyla Zana , the first Kurdish woman to win the European
Sakharov prize of Human Rights, awarded in 1995 by the European Parliament , was
stripped of her parliamentary immunity and sentenced , in 1994 , to 15 years’ imprisonment
, because of a crime of conscience . Other Kurdish MPs , Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan
, and Selim Sadak , all belonging to the pro-
I wish if Turkey could change , become a binational and multicultural
democracy , with two federate states , one predominantly Turkish, the other predominantly
Kurdish, and the liberty for all minority groups to keep their culture . Then there
will be no problem between the Kurds and the Turks . I invite the Kurdish people
in Turkey to struggle for this aim , as their right of self-
I
wish Abdullah Ocalan long life , and freedom if possible. Good or less good , the
Kurds are doomed, his partisans included , to have a common future.
25) Appendice:
Estimate of Kurdistan area and Kurdish population (in 2000)
_____________Kurdish population by mid-
Kurds in Kurds out
States Total Kurds Kurdistan % of Kurdistan %
-
-
-
-
Totals ............. 39,1 27,2 : 69,8 % 11,9 : 30,2
% of 39,1 millions.
Kurdish external
Diaspora.......
-
-
-
republics ....... 00,7 3.............................................
00,73
-
-
-
Kurdistan ( average 13 %) ............. 04,0
Total pop. of Kurdistan . ......... 31,2 millions................................................. ………..
1 Including Kurds implanted in Khurasan by shah Abbas in 17th cent. (now more than
one million).
2 Including Kurdish nationals of different European states, and non
declared workers.
3 More than one half of these are practically assimilated, in Turkistan
and Azerbaijan.
To be remarked that the Kurds who suffered the most from dispersion
and deportation are those of Turkey , over a period of eight decades, from 1925 on.
Another remark is the urbanisation of the Kurdish society, because of the worldwide
trend , and the destruction of Kurdish rural areas. Several Kurdish cities have a
population between half a million to nearly one million – Kirmanshah reportedly 2
millions -
I define Kurdistan , homeland of the Kurdish people , as geographically constituted
of the contiguous regions that had a Kurdish majority at the end of the First World
War . Its area is about 440'000 sq.km , as follow : 224'000 sq.km for Turkish Kurdistan
(known as the Northern) , 124'000 sq.km for Iranian Kurdistan (said Eastern), 75'000
sq.km for Iraqi Kurdistan (said Southern) , and 18'000 sq.km for Syrian Kurdistan
(in three regions) . These estimates are based on governmental data for the administrative
units making part, totally or partially , of Kurdistan , according to that definition.
The population figures, in the table above, are based on the results of official
census for the concerned provinces . An error margin , for the areas and their population,
of about 5 % , is admissible.
Ismet Cheriff Vanly.
Lausanne , 30 March 2004.
دار نشر حقائق المشرق. جنيف
Editions ORIENT-