The limits of Russia's south Syria strategy: Symbolic posturing or revival of influence?

With Israeli incursions mounting in the south, Damascus is leaning on Moscow for containment – yet Russia’s influence remains limited, leaving the region caught between competing ambitions and fragile security arrangements.

26.11.2025

By Aghiad Hegazi

Source:https://thecradle.co/articles/the-limits-of-russias-south-syria-strategy-symbolic-posturing-or-revival-of-influence

When the government of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad collapsed on 8 December 2024, Syria’s south became the stage for a new round of diplomatic and military recalibration.

Ex-Al-Qaeda leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), who declared himself interim president of Syria on 29 January 2025, quickly shifted his attention to securing a deal with Israel under US auspices – a move that signaled the transitional government’s desire to stabilize borders and reclaim “sovereignty.”

In September, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack confirmed that indirect Syria–Israel talks were “progressing,” with expectations of a de-escalation arrangement. By early November, Sharaa’s visit to Washington was set to formalize the deal.

But within days of his arrival, Tel Aviv raised new demands – chief among them, the creation of a humanitarian corridor toward the restive Druze-majority Suwayda.

Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) soon reported the collapse of the talks, citing Tel Aviv’s shift toward demanding a full peace agreement in return for only a partial withdrawal from Syrian territory. Just as in past rounds of engagement, Israel disrupted the process with a mixture of military posturing and maximalist conditions.

It was in this climate of failed diplomacy that Damascus’s former ally, Moscow, made its move.

Russia’s re-entry: Deterrent or illusion?

On 17 November 2025, a high-level Russian delegation conducted an unannounced tour of nine military sites along the 1974 disengagement line in Syria’s Quneitra Governorate – former Russian outposts vacated months earlier under pressure.

The delegation, composed of senior Russian field officers and a committee from the Syrian Ministry of Defense, inspected multiple positions, including the strategically vital Tulul al-Hamr overlook near the ceasefire line.

Sources indicate that Moscow plans to reactivate the nine posts across Quneitra and Deraa and has already established a permanent logistics hub in Quneitra to assess engineering, infrastructure, and supply-line needs ahead of potential redeployment.

The timing was not coincidental: Damascus saw the move as an effort to stabilize the south, while Tel Aviv viewed it as a direct challenge. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded with a high-profile visit to the Syrian front. Yedioth Ahronoth described the move as a message to three audiences: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara.

During a cabinet session, Netanyahu reportedly said, “Julani came back full of himself from Washington. He is beginning to do all sorts of things that we won’t accept,” using Sharaa’s nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani from when he was an Al-Qaeda chief. He also added that Sharaa “wants to bring Russian forces to the border.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz supported Netanyahu's position, saying in a sarcastic tone, “He came back smelling of perfume,” in reference to Sharaa’s meeting with US President Donald Trump at the Oval Office.

The comments followed a phone call between Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The subtext being Israel would not allow Russia to re-establish itself along its occupied border.

A proxy balancing act

Aziz Moussa, a researcher on international security, tells The Cradle that Israel’s concern is less about Moscow than about Ankara. He notes that Russia provides a buffer, and its presence is aimed at “balancing Turkish influence” without seriously obstructing Israeli operations.

He says technical coordination between Ankara and Damascus – particularly supply chains to bases in central Syria – has triggered unease in Tel Aviv. In response, Israel is reinforcing its regional posture to limit both Turkish and any remnants of Iranian influence.

Moussa further explains that the deployment of Russian forces creates a direct security barrier with Damascus, giving Israel a wider margin for military and intelligence action, and helping to “freeze the status quo” by maintaining control of the positions it has gained since 8 December 2024.

Moussa adds that this arrangement guarantees the freedom of Israeli action against certain targets, thus restoring the coordination mechanism that existed with Russia in the previous stage.

According to him, Tel Aviv sees Russian involvement as a tool to preserve current military gains and delay any binding agreements.

Turkiye sidelined, Israel assertive

Reports of Turkish involvement in Russia’s southern tour were swiftly denied by sources who spoke to The Cradle. Turkiye had no role in the operation – a fact that aligns with Tel Aviv’s firm red lines. Israeli jets have repeatedly bombed Syrian positions where Turkish forces were rumoured to be embedded, signaling rejection of any Turkish military footprint in the area.

By contrast, Israel is tactically more flexible toward Moscow, so long as its movements do not disrupt Israel’s operations.

Russia-based journalist Firas al-Mardini tells The Cradle that Moscow “has the desire or ability to deploy forces in the south as was the case in the time of the previous regime,” noting that the possible Russian role may be limited to “observation points that are established in accordance with the Turkish side,” given that Ankara “today plays the largest role in Syrian politics, especially in military affairs.”

He explains that any Russian presence in the southern region “must be done through full coordination with Turkiye,” before raising a question about the actual purpose of deploying such forces there.

“Russia has no interest in taking this step,” Mardini says, noting that its previous entry into the south was “within the framework of the Astana process and the de-escalation zones,” while the situation is different today, as Russia cannot “play the role of the separation forces entrusted to the United Nations alone.”

He adds that Israel “will not accept the presence of Russian forces in the region” because it has become a “strategic depth” and seeks to impose control over it “for a variety of reasons.”

“Israel will not agree to the presence of any forces, whether Turkish or Russian, in the south. All that has been announced about the deployment of Russian forces was not issued by any official Russian entity, but only came through information published in the media.”

Damascus bets on limited Russian deployment

Despite its limitations, Damascus sees utility in Russian involvement. A senior Syrian source tells The Cradle that the goal is to use Moscow as a buffer to constrain Israeli incursions, and that this step comes in the context of arrangements linked to the security agreement. According to the source, the Russian tour came after preliminary understandings, but it is Israel that keeps blocking progress.

Also speaking to The Cradle, analyst Ahmed al-Masalmeh says he expects only light deployments, noting that the most that can happen is “the establishment of some points that include elements of the Russian military police,” provided that their role is limited to monitoring only, “without carrying out any deterrence operations or preventing Israeli movements in the event of their occurrence.”

Masalmeh says that Damascus “would like any step that would limit or contain Israeli incursions,” considering that the Syrian government “welcomes any measure that alleviates the ongoing Israeli provocations.”

Syria is trying to limit provocations through any means available, he adds. Still, he concedes that Israel is unlikely to alter its strategy. Incursions are part of Tel Aviv's pressure campaign, and Russian flags on outposts will not stop them.

He argues Israel “does not seek only a security agreement but also full normalization with Damascus,” despite the stalemate in negotiations between the two sides. The only way forward, Masalmeh says, is a coordinated track involving Syria, Russia, Turkiye, and Israel.

Damascus is also betting on giving Moscow a greater role in the south in exchange for the coastal arena remaining quiet. But this approach has already proven limited after Moscow withdrew from the south at an earlier stage, leaving the area open to Israeli expansion.

Russia’s hollow umbrella

Before its withdrawal in late 2024, Moscow had portrayed itself as the stabilizer of Syria’s south. Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentyev warned in media interviews of a potential Israeli invasion – and implied Russia would react negatively.

But subsequent events proved that this narrative did not materialize: Russia itself withdrew before the fall of Assad's government and left the south untouched, while Israel continued its operations indifferently. The recent Russian tour, framed again as deterrence, repeats an old script.

In other words, what was said before the fall about a “Russian deterrent umbrella” has not been realized.

The Syrian government is betting that a visible Russian presence can tilt negotiations. But this bet depends on Tel Aviv’s approval, Moscow’s willingness to engage, Ankara’s acquiescence, and Washington’s direction.

Without alignment among those four, southern Syria remains in limbo, its future dictated more by external players than by anything decided in Damascus.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.