With Iran weakened, can Trump's 'pre-emptive escalation' in Yemen deal a fatal blow to the Houthis?

Trump's US strikes on Yemen’s Houthis mark a major escalation, aiming to deter maritime attacks and pressure Iran.

17.03.2025

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/can-trumps-red-sea-campaign-deal-fatal-blow-yemens-houthis

Fourteen months ago, then-President Joe Biden initiated US military strikes on Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis) group, following the maritime attacks it launched in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 'in support of Gaza' in November 2023.

Although the Houthi attacks paused during the Gaza ceasefire (19 January – 17 March 2025), Israel’s decision to impose a blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza at the start of this month and resume the war this week prompted Ansar Allah to announce that their operations against Israeli vessels would restart.

Despite no attacks taking place by the Houthis, the Trump administration pre-emptively resumed the Biden-era operations against the Houthis on 15 March, two days before Israel began bombing the Gaza Strip and killing hundreds of Palestinians, effectively terminating the ceasefire that had been in place for nearly two months.

The US strikes against the Houthis on 15 March hit more than 30 targets, including weapons production and storage facilities, drone infrastructure, and command-and-control and training sites in Sanaa, Saada, al-Bayda, and Radaa. These attacks carried out by the US killed 53 people and wounded another 98, including civilians according to Houthi officials. US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz explained that this first round of strikes “targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out.” The US military waged new rounds of attacks following 15 March, hitting Hodeidah.

There is no sign that the Trump administration plans on halting these strikes. On 16 March, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that these “unrelenting” attacks on the Houthis would continue until Ansar Allah ends all maritime attacks, referring to the Houthi operations that began in November 2023 but paused after the implementation of the Gaza ceasefire on 19 January. Speaking to reporters at the Pentagon the following day, Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said, “Today, the operation continues, and it will continue in the coming days until we achieve the president’s objectives.”

Ansar Allah’s leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi vowed that the rebels would target US ships in the Red Sea if Washington’s military attacks on Yemen continue. “We will respond to the American enemy with missile strikes and targeting its warships and naval vessels.”

The rebel movement’s political bureau called the US military strikes a “war crime.” A Houthi source told Newsweek that Ansar Allah “will not allow Trump to support the Zionist enemy in its crime of killing the people of Gaza with hunger and thirst” and that the Houthis “will increase pressure on the Zionists, and if the Americans escalate, we will confront their escalation with an escalation they do not expect.”

What will Trump’s strikes lead to?

These US strikes which began on 15 March have been of far greater intensity than those carried out last year by Trump’s predecessor, marking a significant escalation.

“The key message here is deterrence. Under Biden, the US lost deterrence with the Houthis. Now, President Trump, his team, and CENTCOM are actively working to restore that balance,” explained Mohammed al-Basha, founder of US-based Middle East security advisory Basha Report, in an interview with The New Arab.

“The first strike under Trump targeted Al-Jaraf, a neighbourhood equivalent to Dahiya for Hezbollah. To the best of my knowledge, this marks the first time a US airstrike has hit a residential building known to be used by Ansar Allah—whether as a political office, an intelligence hub, a training site, or a gathering place for strategic planning,” he added.

Eleonora Ardemagni, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, spoke to TNA about how these renewed operations against the Houthis are not the same as those carried out under Biden’s watch last year. She noted how Washington and Tel Aviv seem to be much more on the same page vis-à-vis Ansar Allah now that Trump has returned to the White House.

“Trump's emphasis on targeting the Houthi leadership sounds different from Biden's statements, whose focus was conversely on degrading the offensive capabilities of the group, and thwarting imminent threats to vessels. Rather, the new US strategic and communication stance vis-à-vis the Houthis echoes the Israeli government ones,” Ardemagni told TNA.

“Since 2024, top officials of the Israeli government have repeatedly threatened to ‘decapitate’ the Houthi leadership, as occurred with Hamas and Hezbollah. This suggests a growing strategic convergence between American and Israeli governments, also on the Yemeni and Red Sea front,” she explained.

What Trump’s administration seeks to achieve through this bombing of Yemen is less than clear. What also remains to be seen is how far the US will go with these anti-Houthi operations and for how long Washington will sustain these strikes. Some experts do not expect this intensification of US strikes on Yemen to successfully deter Ansar Allah from waging future maritime attacks.

“The intensity is certainly on a different level than what we’ve seen the Biden administration doing in Yemen, and targeting individual leaders of the Houthis is certainly an escalation of what we’ve seen so far. But more than degradation, they won’t be able to achieve anything. Degradation is probably the only thing they can really achieve,” Dr Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, told TNA.

“We should understand that this is a limited move and, so far, these are all remote strikes, remote operations. That’s as far as Trump goes—remote operations, not putting soldiers into harm’s way and keeping costs for the US taxpayers to a minimum. But that also means you can only really sustain an operation like this for a limited period of time. The Houthis know that they just have to sustain it for a bit because Trump will be very unpopular at home if this becomes a longer operation which doesn’t deliver any clear sort of outcomes,” he added.

A message to Iran?

The Trump administration’s decision to escalate in Yemen with these intense strikes on Houthi targets must also be understood within the wider context of the White House’s efforts to subject Iran to greater pressure through economic sanctions and military action against groups within the Tehran-led Axis of Resistance.

In light of Israel dealing Lebanon’s Hezbollah serious blows last year, the consequences of Tel Aviv’s war on Gaza since 7 October 2023, and the Iran-allied Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad falling on 8 December, the Axis of Resistance is much weaker today compared to previous times. Along with pro-Iran Iraqi factions, Yemen’s Ansar Allah remains the strongest leg in this coalition of groups aligned with the Islamic Republic.

Mindful of the Trump administration’s desire to push Iran into a corner and pressure Tehran into agreeing to a new nuclear deal—and one which would restrict Iran far more than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did—the Trump administration appears committed to taking full advantage of the Axis of Resistance’s weakened position. In practice, this seems to entail waging pre-emptive strikes on the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

“Iranian leaders are eager for an agreement with the US that would lift sanctions, but they refuse to talk on Trump’s terms which rely on maximum pressure. Trump’s decision to bomb Yemen was not only a direct message to the Houthis to halt their maritime attacks but also served as a stark reminder to Tehran that the Americans have the upper hand in any future talks. A clear message was sent to Iran: to have sanctions lifted, it must reconsider its relationships with regional allies. The strikes served as a threat to Iran that it could be the next target and was a show of US military capabilities that could easily be deployed against Tehran too,” explained Veena Ali-Khan, a fellow at the Century Foundation, in an interview with TNA.

“Iran is anxious over the prospect of an even more complicated road to lifting sanctions, and it certainly doesn’t want the Houthis to ruin chances of sanctions relief. Yet, Trump is prepared to connect the different regional files and capitalise on Tehran’s weakened position. The next day, Iranian officials travelled to Muscat, partly in an attempt to de-escalate tensions with Houthi leaders there. With its main deterrence strategy—the axis of resistance—severely compromised, it is difficult to see what cards Tehran has left to play in future talks with the Trump administration,” she added.

Dr Elisabeth Kendall, director of Girton College at the University of Cambridge, believes that Iran might be “next in the line of fire” and that Trump is doing more than simply sending Tehran a message. “It could be seen as a prelude, even a prerequisite for bombing Iran. Degrading Houthi capability removes Iran’s strongest remaining lever, following the decapitation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime. It would leave Iran few retaliatory options in the event of a direct US-Israeli campaign to prevent its nuclear breakout,” she told TNA.

A key question is, how will Tehran respond to the Trump administration’s escalatory moves against Ansar Allah in Yemen?

Beyond the strong rhetoric condemning Washington for waging these military strikes against Iran’s close Yemeni ally, it is probably safe to assume that Tehran will act cautiously. At this stage, it would be foolish for the Islamic Republic to seek an all-out conflict with the US and the leadership in Tehran is likely far too wise to fall for any such trap, which is what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu desperately wants.

“Despite accusations of Iranian support for the Houthis, Tehran is strategically distancing itself to avoid US retaliation. Iranian officials now emphasise Houthi independence, mirroring Iran’s shifting approach to Hezbollah and Assad when support became costly. This aligns with Tehran’s broader strategy of maintaining plausible deniability while benefiting from regional destabilisation,” noted Afrah Nasser, a non-resident fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, in a TNA interview.

“By downplaying ties, Iran avoids escalation with the US, prioritising state actors and diplomatic maneuvering over militant proxies. As seen before, when the risks outweigh the rewards, Iran recalibrates its alliances, leaving its partners to navigate conflicts on their own,” she explained.

Farea al-Muslimi, a research fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, is also of the view that Tehran will probably not interfere on Ansar Allah’s behalf.

“I don’t think [Iran] will even respond…like it did after Hassan Nasrallah [was killed]. I think it will just continue to smuggle weapons to the Houthis and of course pray for them. [Many] prayers, especially during Ramadan,” he told TNA.

It is important to appreciate that the Houthis have significant autonomy from Iran, especially compared to other actors in the Axis of Resistance such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), and Afghan and Pakistan Shi’a militias that previously fought in the Syrian civil war.

“On Truth Social, Trump threatened Iran, saying that additional Houthi attacks would be viewed as direct attacks from Iran. However, Russia was aiding the Houthis with their targeting. Regardless, Iran has asked the Houthis to reduce tensions, to no avail,” noted Dr Annelle Sheline, a research fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, in an interview with TNA.

Thus, with the US administration discounting the Houthis’ agency and inaccurately assessing that Tehran controls Ansar Allah as if it is an Iranian proxy, Washington could make decisions vis-à-vis Yemen and Iran that lead to increasingly dangerous outcomes.

“I think Iran stands in an uncomfortable position now. [On] one hand, it knows the Houthis are its last external deterrence ring, together with the PMF in Iraq. But, on the other hand, Iran is aware it can't fully control the Houthis, since they are partners, not proxies. Washington is trying to deter Tehran while striking Sanaa. However, such a choice risks to inextricably bind the Yemen dossier with the Iran one, thus missing the domestic goals driving Houthis’ actions in the Red Sea, and the broader Yemeni scenario. This will further complicate US decision-making, since it could lead to misleading choices by Washington,” Ardemagni told TNA.

A balancing act for Gulf monarchies

The Trump administration’s decision to wage these strikes against the Houthis in Yemen create dilemmas for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Ultimately, it can’t be stressed enough how important it is for the Gulf Arab monarchies to strike a delicate balancing act as this escalation continues with Trump waging intense attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen. They are keen to contain the threat posed by Ansar Allah, which Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular view as an extremely dangerous group, but these Gulf Arab states understandably fear the risks of escalation spiraling out of control while the unpredictability of Trump adds countless other layers of uncertainty to the tense situation.

“For Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, US military actions in Yemen carry significant strategic implications. They have made concessions to the Houthis, yet the group's demands have only escalated. Over the years, both military intervention and diplomatic negotiations have failed to bring the Houthis to a compromise. Given this impasse, some in the GCC may see US military action as a potential solution. However, they must also balance this with concerns over appearing overly dependent on Washington while continuing to advocate for stability through diplomatic channels,” explained Nasser.

At this point, the Gulf Arab leaders want to see stability prevail in the neighbourhood so that the six GCC members can make progress in terms of their visions for economic development and diversification. Achieving such goals requires luring sufficient business, investment, and tourism to their countries, and with conflicts in the region proving to be highly contagious, the Gulf Arab countries are extremely nervous about what will come next and the implications for peace and security in the Gulf. But the Gaza ceasefire having recently collapsed and the violence resuming in Yemen, the GCC members have much to lose from what has recently unfolded in the region. With the Red Sea being an extremely important body of water for these oil- and gas-rich countries, no Gulf Arab state has any interest in seeing these regional tensions exacerbate.

Saudi Arabia, which spent years being bogged down in a costly quagmire in Yemen and suffered from many Houthi missile and drone attacks against targets in the Kingdom, is desperate to avoid being caught in the crossfire of escalations with Ansar Allah. With the exception of Bahrain, the GCC states have not participated in American-British military operations against the Houthis, which is largely a consequence of Gulf Arab leaders understanding that such participation on their part would subject them to Ansar Allah’s wrath, which is the last thing they want. For the GCC members, avoiding further escalation is the objective.

“The Saudis certainly have no interest in escalation. They might provide some intelligence support. They might provide assistance in overflight rights to the Americans. But that’s about it. They don’t want to be seen as complicit in this operation,” offered Dr Krieg.

“Despite the ongoing military developments, Saudi Arabia has not issued any statements in support of operations against the Houthis. Instead, Riyadh appears committed to preserving the fragile ceasefire established in April 2022 and prioritising diplomatic engagement with the Houthis. However, the designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and the current large-scale military operations risk complicating this dynamic. Furthermore, there is no indication that Saudi Arabia has granted the US access to its bases for attacks on Yemen, including aerial refueling or direct bombing missions against the Houthis at this stage,” Basha told TNA.

But the longer Washington wages such strikes and the more intense they become, officials in Riyadh will have greater cause for concern about where such escalation will ultimately leave the Kingdom and the other GCC states.

“The risk to Saudi and other GCC states is that Houthi firepower may be turned on them to punish America by punishing its regional allies and possibly spiking the oil price. So much depends on how successful and sustained the current US campaign against the Houthis proves,” noted Dr Kendall.

“Saudi Arabia is keeping a low profile, as quite frankly there’s no reason for it to make noise and risk its own security for Washington’s sake. After all, it can sit back and watch the Americans implement the military strategies and sanctions against the Houthis it has long advocated for but has struggled to successfully enforce. This approach, which essentially lets the US to act as the 'bad cop', has temporarily kept Saudi away from the crossfires. However, I struggle to see how this could last forever. If US strikes intensify and the Houthis suspect Riyadh of providing intelligence, Saudi Arabia’s strategy could backfire, and the Houthis would turn its sights to Riyadh,” explained Ali-Khan.

It should be noted that Trump has proven to be less concerned about the national security of the US’s Arab allies and partners than Saudi Arabia’s leadership would like to see from an American president. This was on display when Trump responded to the 2019 Saudi Aramco attacks in a manner that unsettled Riyadh. Also, earlier this year, he proposed an outlandish and deranged plan for Gaza that, if implemented, would have resulted in the destabilisation of Egypt and Jordan’s governments because of the influx of 2.2 million Palestinians into those countries.

“Riyadh’s main priority right now is not falling victim to Houthi strikes—it wants to de-risk as much as possible. It was not too long ago when the Houthis were directly pinging missiles across Saudi borders. Threatening to strike at Gulf countries is the most efficient and effective strategy Houthis use to get what they want. They hope that Gulf fears of being caught in the crossfire is enough to also force the US to de-escalate. This could have worked for the Biden administration, but not Trump,” Ali-Khan told TNA.

The UAE’s position

Where the UAE fits into the picture is perhaps one of the most interesting questions.

Although the leadership in Abu Dhabi calls for de-escalation, some analysts think the UAE is keen to see the US and groups in Yemen go after Ansar Allah rather aggressively, suggesting that the Abu Dhabi is truly somewhat pleased with Trump’s handling of the Houthi rebels.

“The UAE is always a lot of double-speak. They don’t want to be dragged directly into a conflict. They certainly don’t want to be seen as supporting military action. But they, through their network of proxies, seem to be quite happy to keep pressure on the Houthis and advocate for more pressure on the Houthis militarily,” said Dr Krieg.

This stance relates to the UAE’s quest to become a maritime power with much influence in Yemen, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa.

“The Emiratis, in particular, are most inclined toward an offensive to seize Hodeida from the Houthis—a move that would uproot the Houthis from the Red Sea. This has been a long-standing goal of the UAE, and with the Houthis disrupting global trade, it now seems increasingly attainable, potentially securing the necessary political support,” noted Ali-Khan.

“However, the extent of US support for such an initiative remains uncertain, as does its consistency. Moreover, the palpable risk of Houthi missile attacks on Abu Dhabi, similar to those in 2022, looms large, if the Emiratis—through their forces on the ground—initiate such an offensive,” she added.

“Regarding the UAE, the Houthis may opt to avoid escalating tensions with Saudi Arabia by directly targeting Abu Dhabi instead, using the same strategy to pressure the UAE into advocating for a pause in hostilities. However, if the conflict escalates on the ground—whether on the western coast, in the south, or in the east—the Houthis may shift their focus to attacking joint resistance forces along the western front, the [Southern Transitional Council (STC)] and Giant Brigades in the south, or forces in Marib,” Basha told TNA.

“Such actions could lead to intensified confrontations with UAE-backed factions, potentially dragging Abu Dhabi further into the conflict. If the Houthis advance southward, the UAE may move beyond a passive stance, as the south represents a critical red line for them,” he commented.

Looking ahead, if the US military strikes on the Houthis continue for an extended period of time and this violence further escalates, it will be important to monitor any possible tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s goals, tactics, and agendas possibly clashing at some point. Given how much influence Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed have with Trump and those in his inner circle, there could be a Saudi-Emirati struggle when it comes to lobbying the US administration to act one way or another vis-à-vis Yemen that could play out in the upcoming period.

The Saudi leadership’s moment of vindication

This month marks exactly one decade since the Saudi-led military coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm. Today, some in the Gulf have strong feelings about the Houthis based on their perceptions of western states failing to truly comprehend the threat posed by Ansar Allah in the 2014-22 period.

“I think it’s important to remember that, more or less, the Gulf politics toward the West regarding the Houthis is ‘we told you so.’ They felt they went into a war for eight years alone and the United States, the United Kingdom, and everyone left them, failed them, and dumped them, despite the billions of dollars of weapons. But [those are] their feelings, and feelings are feelings,” noted Muslimi, who explained that the GCC states have no interest in fighting the Houthis on Washington and London’s behalf now.

“In a way they also don’t want conflicts in the region to further escalate. That’s very true, especially for Saudi Arabia and MBS…They pretty much actually hope that while this might do what they couldn’t do to the Houthis, but they also hope that this will not stay for too long,” added the Chatham House’s Yemen expert.

Dr Sheline has the same perspective.

She told TNA, “MBSlikely feels that he told the Americans ‘I told you so’ when it came to the Houthis and the threat they posed, he may be enjoying the schadenfreude of watching the US try and fail to deter the Houthis now, but he is not eager for the violence to expand or otherwise threaten his economic goals for his country.”

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero