[OPINION] With peace talks stalled, Ankara weighs military action in Syria

15.12.2025

By Turkish Minute

Source:https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/12/15/opinion-with-peace-talks-stalled-ankara-weighs-military-action-in-syria/

By Ömer Murat*

In recent months, renewed talk of peace in Turkey’s decades-long Kurdish conflict has been marked by growing ambiguity. According to a recent academic analysis by political scientist Gabriele Leone from the University of Lapland in Finland, jailed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan’s latest call for a ceasefire should be understood less as a concrete plan for resolving the conflict and more as a symbolic intervention. It is an attempt to reassert political relevance and reopen channels of dialogue amid tightening authoritarian control and shrinking political space. In this reading, the language of peace functions not as a guarantee of de-escalation but as a performative gesture unfolding against a backdrop of repression, securitization and unresolved power asymmetries.

Recent developments in Ankara and northern Syria seem to confirm this diagnosis. Although the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formally keeps the door to a new peace process open, signals emerging from pro-government media suggest otherwise: mounting impatience, hardening security rhetoric and preparations for a possible military action in Syria. Rather than reflecting confidence in negotiations with the PKK and its regional affiliates, recent commentary suggests that the process has reached an impasse. As economic pressures intensify at home and regional dynamics shift rapidly, Ankara appears increasingly inclined to abandon a fragile and politically costly peace narrative in favor of a controlled security escalation beyond its borders.

There has been a discernible shift toward military intervention, revealing the government’s frustration with the process and broader geopolitical calculations. A review of recent reporting and commentary reveals the extent to which Ankara is preparing public opinion and international partners for such a move.

Pro-government publications collectively signal growing impatience. One prominent example came from the Türkiye newspaper on December 7. The paper cited an unnamed security official who claimed that Washington had finally come to understand what Ankara had argued for years, that without Turkey’s cooperation, the United States cannot influence outcomes in the Middle East. The source emphasized the need for a partnership between Washington and Ankara in Syria, Gaza and the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The source viewed recent US overtures as steps toward stabilizing the Middle East before withdrawal.

The official also asserted that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) would be absorbed into the Syrian army as individuals rather than as an organized entity by year’s end. The official insisted that the SDF leadership, a coalition dominated by elements linked to the PKK, would not be permitted to assume positions within the Damascus government. This positions Turkey as an enabler of Syrian sovereignty while advancing its anti-PKK agenda. If the terms of the reported “March 10 agreement,” signed by interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi are not met, Damascus will move militarily to assert control with Turkey’s backing. According to the official, minor clashes were already taking place, and while the SDF still showed resistance, the United States, Syria and Turkey ultimately agreed on the need for its dissolution. He argued that Israel is attempting to disrupt this trajectory.

On December 10 Sabah columnist Hilal Kaplan, a key pro-government voice, complemented this argument, contending that developments along the Iraq-Syria corridor were heightening, rather than easing, Turkey’s security concerns. While Ankara was cautiously continuing the peace process, Kaplan contended that the PKK and SDF were not taking any steps consistent with de-escalation. Kaplan described the Kurdish movement’s internal actors, from SDF units on the ground to the PKK leadership in the Kandil Mountains of Iraq, as issuing signals that undermine the possibility of a negotiated outcome. Kaplan argued that a decisive moment was approaching in which these actors would either align with instructions from  Öcalan on İmralı Island, or the process would collapse once again. She suggested that the future of the peace process would be determined in Syria and that the question now was whether that line would be drawn peacefully or violently.

Perhaps the clearest preview of Ankara’s thinking appeared in an article by pro-government Hürriyet journalist Hande Fırat on December 9. Drawing on conversations with security and intelligence officials, Fırat wrote that Turkey had presented the United States with firm demands: no PKK-linked command structures along Turkey’s border and no autonomous political status for Kurdish structures in Syria, not even in an integrated form. According to Fırat, US President Donald Trump had instructed his team to seek a resolution. However, negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, reportedly supervised by Washington and Ankara, had stalled due to disagreements over command structures. Damascus rejected SDF proposals that would preserve the group’s internal hierarchy. As the year came to a close, Fırat warned that time was running out. Absent compliance from the SDF, both Ankara and Damascus were prepared to take military action.

Taken together, these reports point to a consistent conclusion: The peace process is faltering. Weakened by economic discontent and slipping popularity, President Erdoğan now faces the challenge of explaining to his nationalist base any concessions that a genuine settlement would require, such as easing the prison conditions of Öcalan or accepting some form of Kurdish self-administration in Syria. For years Erdoğan has used the Kurdish conflict to polarize voters. With elections two years away and a struggling economy dragging down his approval ratings, the political incentives to pivot back to a security-focused strategy are clear.

Polling by the pro-government GENAR research company highlights the depth of the economic malaise. According to its findings 31.5 percent of respondents said they had “no confidence” in the government’s economic management, while another 34 percent said they “do not have confidence,” the highest recorded level. Only 17.1 percent expressed any degree of trust. Looking ahead, just 23.2 percent expect economic conditions to improve by 2026, while 64 percent anticipate further deterioration. These numbers strengthen the likelihood that Erdoğan may resort to military action again to shift public attention from economic hardship to national security.

Ankara appears confident that it can persuade the Trump administration to tolerate, if not support, a new operation. Turkish officials are increasingly accusing Israel of encouraging the SDF to resist compromising with Damascus. This claim echoes recent observations by Charles Lister, senior fellow and director of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute. At an MEI forum last week, Lister said US officials believe that some SDF members are hindering earlier agreements with Damascus. Lister noted that the group has spent months digging tunnels across cities in northeastern Syria, which is a clear sign that the SDF is preparing for confrontation rather than integration.

One year after Assad’s fall, the impasse persists. This prolongation risks broader instability. As Syria’s new regime under President al-Sharaa marks its first anniversary, Ankara has reiterated warnings to the SDF, threatening intervention if the March 10 agreement is not honored. The region may be on the brink of another conflict. With Turkish support, al-Sharaa’s forces could confront the SDF, unraveling the fragile stability that currently exists. Such a clash would reverberate across the region and potentially worsen already tense relations between Israel and Turkey.

The picture emerging from government-aligned media is clear: The peace process is losing momentum while preparations for a military alternative are intensifying. Whether this is posturing to pressure the SDF, an attempt to reshape domestic narratives or the precursor to a real operation remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the next decisive turn in Turkey’s Kurdish policy may come not at the negotiating table but on the battlefield.

* Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute.