Israel's 2026 election: What will it mean for the Middle East?

Analysis: Israel's election may end Netanyahu's rule, but is unlikely to fundamentally alter its long-term approach to the Middle East

06.10.2026

By Giorgio Cafiero*

Source:https://www.newarab.com/analysis/israels-2026-election-what-will-it-mean-middle-east

Israel’s 27 October election could produce a major political turning point domestically. However, it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic shifts in Israeli foreign policy that many around the world might hope for.

A victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would likely strengthen the influence of Israel’s far-right parties, while a government led by figures such as Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, or other opposition leaders could bring a less confrontational tone and greater diplomatic flexibility.

Nonetheless, there is notable continuity across Israel’s political mainstream regarding Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. This month’s election, therefore, is unlikely to fundamentally change how Tel Aviv approaches the region.

Three years after the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, Israel remains at war, its relations with certain Western countries have significantly deteriorated, and tensions with Jordan and Egypt are increasingly tied to developments in Gaza and the West Bank.

Yet, the election offers no obvious choice between fundamentally different visions of Israel’s regional role. The opposition has a shot at defeating Netanyahu, but the leading candidates largely agree on the centrality of military power, threat perceptions of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and the rejection of basic rights for Palestinians.

Nonetheless, this is not to say that the question of who will be Israel’s prime minister is not important. Netanyahu has become increasingly dependent on far-right partners such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose influence extends well beyond their electoral strength.

Their leverage has helped push settlement expansion, the weakening of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and a harder line on Gaza and the West Bank toward the centre of government policy. Netanyahu securing another victory could reinforce the political power of such extremist forces.

However, replacing Netanyahu would not necessarily mean replacing the strategy that has brought Israel into its current confrontation with various regional state and non-state actors.

A government led by Eisenkot, Bennett, or another opposition figure would probably be less dependent on the far right, more receptive to American pressure, and more cautious in its rhetoric.

Perhaps such a post-Netanyahu Israeli government could rein in settler violence to some degree, take a more cooperative approach to Gaza’s reconstruction, and give Jordan and Egypt greater diplomatic space, albeit with far narrower differences when it comes to the larger questions - chiefly Iran, Hezbollah, Israeli control of Palestinian territory and Palestinian statehood.

Israel’s political centre has moved so far to the right since the “Oslo years” (1993-2000) that a government led by one of Netanyahu’s challengers could change the tone and tactics of Israeli policy, albeit without making fundamental changes in direction.

“Chances are that a successor to Netanyahu would find himself handling the same regional issues using the same tools, in pursuit of mostly the same interests. There would be some variance, to be sure, and perhaps Israel would frame its involvement in places like Lebanon, Syria, and Iran differently. But the overall trajectory might be similar,” explained Aron Lund, an associate fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in an interview with The New Arab.

“Israel would likely want to hold captured ground, weaken its enemies, and extract a steep price for any concession,” he added. Other experts agree. When discussing the possibility of a post-Netanyahu government resulting from this month’s election, Dr Rouzbeh Parsi, an affiliated researcher at Lund University, said we should not expect any change in Tel Aviv’s foreign policy strategy.

“Eisenkot, Bennett, and Lapid bicker with Netanyahu over the fine-tuning of the approach, the weight of diplomacy, etc. - not whether the wars are necessary or the way they are conducted as such. While they may be more willing to accommodate any US administration on tactics, they will follow the same strategy,” he told The New Arab.

“Capitals in the region are less concerned with who becomes prime minister since all the candidates will stay the course on the large issues.”

Gaza and the West Bank

Some observers see Gaza as a place to look at in terms of meaningful difference with a post-Netanyahu government that is less dependent on Smotrich and Ben-Gvir in charge.

There might be reason to expect such an Israeli government to be more willing to cooperate with the international efforts aimed at rebuilding the genocide-ravaged enclave and to accept some form of Palestinian administration rather than allowing the current stalemate to persist.

Perhaps this government could also be more responsive to pressure from Washington, Cairo, and other governments seeking to stabilise Gaza after the war.

Still, the room for change would have severe limits. Hamas’s disarmament, Israeli security demands, and the sensitive question of who will ultimately govern Gaza are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future regardless of who Israel’s prime minister is.

At the same time, Israel’s political mainstream has little appetite for a return to the pre-7 October status quo. Therefore, while a post-Netanyahu government might make Gaza policy less confrontational and more diplomatically manageable, it is difficult to imagine it fundamentally ending Israel’s military control of the coastal territory or taking meaningful steps that could resolve the underlying conflict.

The West Bank could prove an even more consequential test of whether an Israeli government has genuinely changed course. Under Netanyahu, settlement expansion, settler violence and measures that strengthen Israeli control over Palestinian land have accelerated, while the Palestinian Authority has been weakened economically and politically.

A key concern is not necessarily an immediate, formal annexation, but a slower process of making Palestinian life increasingly difficult through a form of “soft transfer” that could gradually encourage Palestinians to leave.

A less right-wing government could put the brakes on some of these policies and restore greater restraint to the security forces and settler movement. However, that would still fall well short of reversing the occupation, and the leading opposition figures have shown no signs of being prepared to put Palestinian statehood back at the centre of Israeli policy.

“An Israeli government that doesn’t depend on the likes of Smotrich and Ben Gvir would probably be more flexible on the margins in relation to Gaza and the West Bank, and certainly in terms of rhetoric and public framing. Post-Netanyahu, Israel would have a cabinet less prone to saying unhinged, extremist things. With or without an actual policy change, it might help appease Western governments and enable some diplomatic advances,” Lund told The New Arab.

Jordan's growing concerns

The stakes are truly high for Jordan. The leadership in Amman has witnessed the deterioration of the West Bank with growing alarm. It is a given fact that any significant displacement of Palestinians across the Jordan River would have direct consequences for the Hashemite Kingdom’s own political and economic stability.

“Israel's government is pushing the territory to the brink like never before. This has happened since Bezalel Smotrich [became] Finance Minister [and] has funnelled benefits to the settlers whilst protecting violent extremists in their midst. He has also withheld revenue from the [Palestinian Authority (PA)],” explained Dr Rob Geist Pinfold, who teaches International Security at King’s College London, in an interview with The New Arab.

“This is a toxic combination: the PA is weaker, broker, and less legitimate than ever before. Israeli ministers openly talk of annexation and ethnic cleansing, both of which would mean that Jordan could see an influx of Palestinian refugees,” he added.

Jordan already faces serious fiscal pressures and unemployment, and the question of Palestinian identity is deeply embedded in its domestic politics.

Therefore, a new influx from the West Bank would potentially pose a grave threat to Jordan’s existing political order, leaving Amman with few attractive options.

Jordan can appeal to Washington and other Western governments to pressure Tel Aviv, pursue diplomatic and legal measures internationally, or, in an extreme scenario, reconsider aspects of its relationship with Israel, which normalised in 1994.

From Amman’s perspective, the most important question after the Israeli election is whether the next government, regardless of who leads it, is prepared to stop the West Bank from moving toward a point of no return.

Egypt's red lines

Egypt is primarily concerned with preventing the war in Gaza from becoming a new source of regional displacement and instability. Cairo’s overriding red line is any Israeli policy that effectively pushes Palestinians out of Gaza and across the Rafah border into the Sinai Peninsula.

Egyptian officials also want to preserve their role as a central mediator and to play a major part in rebuilding Gaza. This is both because of the security implications and because of Egypt’s longstanding interest in maintaining regional influence.

Perhaps a less confrontational Israeli government could give Cairo more room to pursue those objectives, particularly if it were willing to cooperate with an international reconstruction effort and accept a Palestinian governing structure in Gaza.

Yet, unless Israel and Hamas can agree on security, disarmament, and governance, Egypt will continue to face the risk that Gaza's unresolved conflict spills directly across its border.

Iran and Hezbollah

Iran and Hezbollah are two files where continuity in Tel Aviv’s foreign policy will most likely prove strong. Confronting Iran and weakening Hezbollah are consensus positions within Israel’s political mainstream.

A post-Netanyahu government might be more willing to listen more to Washington, place greater emphasis on diplomacy, or exercise more restraint in choosing when and how to use military force.

However, that is not to say it would abandon the key goal of thwarting the Islamic Republic and its regional allies and partners from rebuilding their military capabilities and reducing their perceived threats to Israel.

This brings us to a distinction which is necessary to draw between strategy and tactics. If Netanyahu loses, the next government could be less provocative and more predictable without being substantially less willing to use force. Ultimately, it is safe to say that a change of Israel’s government would not necessarily translate into a quieter Middle East.

“The Iranians will certainly be watching carefully; although while they will be happy to see Netanyahu lose, and potentially even serve jail time, they are under no illusion that Israeli policy toward Iran will change in any dramatic fashion,” explained Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American author, journalist, and NBC News contributor.

“And if Netanyahu’s party is able to form a government, the Iranians will be on a more serious alert for sabotage and/or assassinations. It does appear that so far Israel, having dragged the US into a war, is happy to see Trump finish it, and it is likely that the next government, even if headed by the opposition, will maintain that policy,” he told The New Arab.

The Washington factor

At the end of the day, in terms of Israel’s relationships with other countries, the election may have the greatest impact on Tel Aviv’s alliance with Washington.

A government without Netanyahu and his far-right partners could be easier for the Americans to work with and more receptive to pressure from Washington, particularly over Gaza, the West Bank, and regional diplomacy.

A post-Netanyahu government could also help repair some of the political damage caused by the current government’s increasingly strained relations with Western allies.

But there is a danger in attributing all of Israel’s declining popularity in the United States to Netanyahu. As Lund observed, the shift in American attitudes toward Israel may reflect a deeper structural change that an Israeli election cannot easily reverse.

A new government might therefore have an opportunity to improve the relationship in the short term without being able to halt the longer-term erosion of support for Israel among parts of the American public and political system.

What changes after 27 October?

Depending on the electoral outcome, Israel might have a new government that is less extreme in its rhetoric, more receptive to Washington, and more willing to accommodate its regional neighbours.

However, those changes can matter only if they translate into different policies on the ground. The crucial questions will be whether it can restrain settler violence and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, find a workable path toward reconstruction and governance in Gaza, and manage its confrontation with Iran without drawing the Middle East into another cycle of war that brings more chaos, death, and destruction.

Just as important will be whether the United States and other international actors maintain pressure once the immediate drama of the election has passed.

A Netanyahu defeat could create an opening for change. But it will not by itself resolve the conflicts that produced Israel’s current isolation and its reputation as a rogue state that its genocidal war in Gaza and borderless aggression across the region have earned it over the past several years.

The world must not mistake a change in tone for a change in direction while allowing the underlying policies to continue.

For Israel’s neighbours and its international partners, what happens after 27 October will matter far more than who wins the election.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero

Edited by Charlie Hoyle